Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International Law by Sepinwall, Amy J
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Legal Studies and Business Ethics Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2009
Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in
Domestic and International Law
Amy J. Sepinwall
University of Pennsylvania, sepin@wharton.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons,
International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Transnational Law
Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/65
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sepinwall, A. J. (2009). Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International Law. Michigan Journal of
International Law, 30 251-303. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/65
Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and
International Law
Abstract
This Article embraces one of two contested understandings of what a failure to punish entails. On the first
understanding, a military commander's failure to punish is construed solely as a dereliction of duty.
Accordingly, his failure to punish constitutes a separate offense from the underlying atrocity that his troops
have committed. The failure to punish is, then, a substantive offense in its own right. On a second
understanding, for which I argue here, the failure to punish renders the commander criminally liable for the
atrocity itself, even if he neither ordered nor even knew about the atrocity before its occurrence. Here, then,
the failure to punish is a mode of liability-it grounds an ascription of the atrocity of one's soldiers to their
commander, but does not capture an offense in its own right. For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to these two
understandings, respectively, as the substantive offense view and mode of liability view, and I shall follow
international and domestic law in employing the term "failure to punish" as a catch-all for the failure to
undertake the duty with which commanders are charged to investigate, report, refer, discipline, punish, and so
on.
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Michigan Journal of International Law
[A] slap on the wrist of the offender is a slap in the face of the
victims.
Mark B. Harmon and Fergal Gaynor, Prosecutors, Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia'
Military justice is to justice what military music is to music.
Groucho Marx and French Premier Georges Clemenceau2
Military spokespeople and upper echelon commanders routinely
maintain that wartime atrocities are the acts of a few "bad apples."3 But
while torture at Abu Ghraib is passed off as the work of a handful of de-
praved souls, 4 and while the Srebrenica massacre "could be reduced to
the machinations of [Slobodan Milosevic],"5 we are still gripped by a
tenacious sense that something more systemic is occurring. Yet the law
does not yield to our unease, and no wonder: In both domestic and inter-
national criminal law, individual causal responsibility is seen to be the
sine qua non of culpability.6 Within that paradigm, systemic harms have
no traction
I. Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, The Sentencing Practice of International
Criminal Tribunals: Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
683,711 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Leslie Southwick, Military Justice for Foreign Terrorists and for Ameri-
can Soldiers: Comparisons and a Mississippi Precedent, 72 Miss. L.J. 781, 784 & n. 12 (2002)
(attributing the quote to Groucho Marx and noting that others have said that Marx borrowed it
from Clemenceau).
3. See, e.g., Michael Massing, "Bad Apples" or Predictable Fruits of War?, L.A.
TIMES, May 10, 2004, at B11.
4. See Phillip Carter, The Road to Abu Ghraib: The Biggest Scandal of the Bush Ad-
ministration Began at the Top, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 2004, at 20, 21 ("The Bush
[A]dministration has condemned the abuses as the work of a 'few bad apples,' while working
diligently to get the story off the front pages and out of the presidential campaign.").
5. See id.; Paul Aaron, The Anguish of Nation Building: A Report from Serbia, 22
WORLD POL'Y J. 113, 120 (2005) (arguing that the exclusive focus on Milosevic's responsibil-
ity "has deflected attention from the complex nature of Milosevic's regime and the enduring
institutionalized legacy it left behind"). The International Court of Justice's (ICJ) decision in
Bosnia's suit against Serbia for genocide did find that the Srebrenica massacre was perpetrated
by a group entity-the army of Republika Srpska. See Judgment on Application of Convention
on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2008
I.C.J. 91, 148-52 (Feb. 26). But, neither the ICJ nor the International Criminal Court (ICC)
has jurisdiction over that entity. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 11,
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the International Court
of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 156 U.N.T.S. 77.
6. This Article is the first piece of a larger project seeking to challenge the too hasty
alignment of individual causal responsibility and criminal liability. For a statement reflecting
reverence for the principle of individual culpability, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Tadi6,
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The intransigence of systemic harms to legal categorization h.s not
prevented other scholars from attempting to elucidate the way in which a
higher-up may be complicit in an atrocity of his troops that he did not
explicitly order: Torture of Afghan and Iraqi detainees committed during
the course of interrogations has been attributed to the promulgation of
intentionally vague and ambiguous directives around what constitutes
appropriate interrogation techniques.8 The My Lai massacre has been
ascribed to a failure of proper leadership "at all levels, from division
down to platoon ... ,9 The Nazis' genocidal program is said to owe its
success to a "quintessential 'bureaucracy of murder.' ",o More generally,
Case No. IT-94-l-A, Appeals Judgment, 186 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadi6 Appeals
Judgment]. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated:
The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national sys-
tems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal
culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in
which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla
poena sine culpa).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
7. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War:
The Problem of Collective Guilt, Ill YALE L.J. 1499, 1514 (2002). Fletcher stated,
[T]he liberal bias toward individual criminal responsibility obscures basic truths
about the crimes that now constitute the core of international criminal law. The four
crimes over which the [International Criminal] Court has jurisdiction-aggression,
crimes of war, crimes against humanity, and genocide-are deeds that by their very
nature are ... committed by groups ....
Id.; see Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility: From Yama-
shita to Blaki6 and Beyond, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 638, 639 (2007) (noting that "a
fundamental dilemma of legal responses to mass atrocity ... is that the atrocities are usually
carried out by foot soldiers but it is often the generals and presidents who bear a greater share
of moral responsibility"); see also Beatrice I. Bonaf6, Command Responsibility Between Per-
sonal Culpability and Objective Liability: Finding a Proper Role for Command
Responsibility, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 599, 600 (2007) ("[I]t can be very difficult to fit the
contribution of commanders into the categories of international criminal law, and to demon-
strate their criminal liability.").
8. See, e.g., Christopher Kutz, The Lawyers Know Sin: Complicity in Torture, in THE
TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 241, 242-43 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2005) [hereinafter Kutz,
Complicity in Torture]; cf M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the
Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 389, 390 (2006) ("[Tlhe President, the Vice
President, and the Secretary of Defense made several official statements on the need for U.S.
interrogators to obtain 'results,' thus creating a top-down command influence leading subordi-
nates to commit torture, while their superiors felt compelled to look the other way."); Mark
Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1751, 1773 & n.99 (2005) [hereinafter Osiel, Banality of Good].
9. Jeffrey F. Addicott & William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of My
Lai: A lime to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REV. 153, 169 (1993) (quoting WILLIAM R.
PEERS, THE MY LAI INQUIRY 232 (1979)).
10. Osiel, Banality of Good, supra note 8, at 1833 & n.374 (citing Albert Breton &
Ronald Wintrobe, The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited, 94 J. POL. EcON. 905 (1986)).
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a code of silence among officers, such as the "'West Point Protective and
Benevolent Association,' "" has been blamed for insulating military su-
periors, but not low-level soldiers, from the administration of military
justice. 2 Still others cite the anomie of war, especially a war whose
moral justification is abstract, or absent altogether,'3 as a way of suggest-
ing that perhaps responsibility lies with the State as a whole. 4 But,
however compelling these theories of moral responsibility may be, they
fail to articulate legally cognizable harms.
Only a handful of theorists have acknowledged the ill fit between the
collective nature of crimes of war and the individualist paradigm of
criminal law,'5 and their response has largely been one of surrender, as
they advocate non-criminal, or even extra-legal, mechanisms for address-
ing war crimes.' 6 In so doing, they have forsaken the drama and
11. WILLIAM T. GENEROUS, JR., SWORDS AND SCALES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 201 (1973); cf Elizabeth L. Hillman, Gentlemen Under
Fire: The U.S. Military and "Conduct Unbecoming", 26 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3 (2008) ("[T]he
perception that high-ranking officers are rarely disciplined and almost never criminally prose-
cuted is so common partly because it is true.").
12. GENEROUS, supra note 11, at 201.
13. See, e.g., Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina and Beyond: Command Responsi-
bility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REv. 155, 163 (2000).
14. But cf Daniel W. Jacobowitz, Alienation, Anomie, and Combat Effectiveness, AIR
U. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 21, 23, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
airchronicles/aureview/1980/sep-oct/jacobowitz.html (exploring the need to overcome societal
trends toward alienation and anomie in military recruitment and training to prevent the disin-
tegration of military units and the deterioration of combat effectiveness).
15. See, e.g., Osiel, Banality of Good, supra note 8, at 1768 (noting that Fletcher and
Drumbl "[have] entertained the possibility that the first principle of domestic criminal law-
personal culpability-may have to be modified or abandoned, if international law is ever to
successfully 'adapt[] ... the paradigm of individual guilt to the cauldron of collective vio-
lence' epitomized by mass atrocity" (quoting Mark A. Drumbl, Pluralizing International
Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1295, 1309 (2005) [hereinafter Drumbl, Pluralizing]
(alteration in original) (citations omitted))); see also Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and
Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 539, 542 (2005)
[hereinafter Drumbl, Collective Violence] ("The dominant discourse determines accountability
through third-party trial adjudication premised on liberalism's construction of the individual as
the central unit of action. This means that a number of selected guilty individuals squarely are
to be blamed for systemic levels of violence." (footnote omitted)); Fletcher, supra note 7, at
1513-26.
16. See Drumbl, Pluralizing, supra note 15, at 1315-22 (supporting the use of gacaca
courts, used in Rwanda, by which individuals accused of crimes "return to the communities
where they allegedly committed their crimes to face judgment by the whole community,"
among other measures, as a way of addressing collective violence); Osiel, Banality of Good,
supra note 8, at 1842-59 (advocating the imposition of collective civil sanctions, the justness
of which is purportedly secured by allowing officers to redistribute the sanction internally so
that it is levied in accordance with individual guilt); cf Daryl Levinson, Collective Sanctions,
56 STAN. L. REV. 345 (2003) (advocating collective sanctions within criminal law, but antici-
pating that the collective's members will in turn distribute the sanctions among themselves, in
accordance with each member's individual culpability).
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expressive character that are the special province of the traditional court-
17
room.
This Article advances an alternative theoretical framework, rooted in
expressivist conceptions of harm, for holding a commander criminally
responsible for an atrocity of his subordinates." More specifically, this
Article argues that, where a commander's failure to punish an atrocity of
his troops can be read as an expression of his support for his subordi-
nates' act or the message it conveyed, his failure comes to constitute part
of the injury. As such, he may be held criminally liable for the atrocity,
and not just for neglecting his duty to punish.
This Article thus embraces one of two contested understandings of
what a failure to punish entails. On the first understanding, a military
commander's failure to punish is construed solely as a dereliction of
duty. Accordingly, his failure to punish constitutes a separate offense
from the underlying atrocity that his troops have committed. The failure
17. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Court-
room, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 627 n.286 (2008) ("To the extent that trials are an opportunity
for society to judge itself and its standards for justice, then the full drama of the courtroom
may be needed to make such a judgment."). For the claim that international tribunals have
been used to narrate history and express society's condemnation of international criminal law
violations, see, for example, MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 3 (2007) (explaining that, in the wake of World War 11, "President Truman ...
envisioned careful trials to narrate to all the value of law and the depth of the defendants'
culpability"); Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Crimi-
nal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law,
93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 94-95 (2005) (describing the narrative function of international criminal
trials). One exception to the retreat from criminal prosecutions for mass atrocity can be found
in Mark Osiel's proposed reconstruction of superior responsibility. See Osiel, Banality of
Good, supra note 8, at 1830-33. Under current doctrine, a superior will bear responsibility for
a subordinate's crime only if the superior actually controlled the subordinate at the time of the
crime. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blagkid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, 9 407-08,
421, 511 (July 29, 2004) [hereinafter Blagki6 Appeals Judgment] (acquitting defendant be-
cause of no effective control); Gregory Raymond Bart, Special Operations Commando Raids
and Enemy Hors de Combat, ARMY LAW., July 2007, at 33, 38 ("Effective control is an ele-
ment of command responsibility."). But, as Osiel argues, a superior's control ebbs and flows
throughout a military operation, and the entity to which he belongs may be organized in a
complex and fluid fashion such that he can convincingly argue that he lacked control over the
direct perpetrator. See Osiel, Banality of Good, supra note 8, at 1830-32. To better capture the
organizational dynamics of the groups committing mass atrocities today, Osiel advocates an
approach proposed by Claus Roxin: that the law consider not whether a superior had control
over the particular subordinate who directly perpetrated the crime, but instead whether the
superior had control over the organizational apparatus of which the subordinate was a part. Id.
at 1830-33. My problem with command responsibility lies not so much in its element of ef-
fective control but instead in its lax understanding of the nature of the harm that a
commander's omission involves. Osiel's proposal leaves this understanding intact. Thus, even
if Osiel's conception of control were to result in more convictions for commanders, it would
not remedy the problem that is the subject of this Article.
18. I use the masculine version of the third-person singular pronoun throughout this
Article when referring to the generic commander in order to reflect women's historic exclu-
sion from the officer corps. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 11, at 43-44.
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to punish is, then, a substantive offense in its own right. On a second
understanding, for which I argue here, the failure to punish renders the
commander criminally liable for the atrocity itself, even if he neither
ordered nor even knew about the atrocity before its occurrence. Here,
then, the failure to punish is a mode of liability-it grounds an ascription
of the atrocity of one's soldiers to their commander, but does not capture
an offense in its own right. For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to these
two understandings, respectively, as the substantive offense view and
mode of liability view,'9 and I shall follow international and domestic law
in employing the term "failure to punish" as a catch-all for the failure to
undertake the duty with which commanders are charged to investigate,
report, refer, discipline, punish, and so on.20
Although the doctrine of command responsibility typically criminal-
izes a commander's failure to prevent or punish an atrocity of his
• 21
subordinates, this Article focuses on the failure to punish prong for two
reasons. First, that prong provides unique prosecutorial advantages. One
of the most vexing problems for those who prosecute war crimes and
crimes against humanity is the difficulty of achieving convictions against
the big fish, rather than just the small fry.22 It is very difficult to prove
that a commander failed to prevent an atrocity, since to do so a prosecu-
tor must establish that the commander knew or should have known about
the atrocity prior to its occurrence, 2 and often no such knowledge is rea-
sonably available to the commander. But, imputing knowledge of the
atrocity to the commander after the atrocity has been committed is less
19. These two possible constructions of the failure to punish were elucidated in Prose-
cutor v. Halilovid, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial Judgment, 91-100 (Nov. 15, 2005)
[hereinafter Halilovih Trial Judgment]. The terminology should thus be familiar to interna-
tional criminal law scholars. Domestic criminal law scholars might wonder whether domestic
accomplice liability represents a third possible way of understanding the failure to punish.
There are two reasons for thinking that it does not. First, the language of the complicity doc-
trine within domestic military law suggests a fairly rigorous causation requirement. See
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 877(2) (2008). Second, it is doubtful that even
the more capacious understanding of accomplice liability that holds outside of the military
context would accommodate the nature of the harm inflicted by the commander who fails to
punish an atrocity of his troops. I elaborate on this point below. See discussion infra Part l.B.
20. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Respon-
sibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 176 (1972) (describing a commander's "failure to take corrective
action" as encompassing, inter alia, the failure to discipline, educate, prosecute, report, etc.).
21. See, e.g., Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 7(3), S.C. Res. 827, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827/Annex (May 25, 1993),
amended by S.C. Res. 1660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1600 (Feb. 28, 2006), reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1163 (1994) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
22. See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 17; Eric A. Posner, Transitional Justice as
Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761,800 (2004).
23. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 21 (stating that a commander may be held
criminally responsible if he "knew or had reason to know" that his subordinates had commit-
ted an offense and if he failed to punish that offense).
[Vol. 30:251
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problematic, both because a more liberal time period is in play, and be-
cause the atrocity calls attention to itself in a way that the hushed
murmurs of his subordinates' plans do not, or that the spontaneous wag-
24ing of an atrocity cannot. In short, then, the mental state element is
much easier to establish for a charge of failure to punish than for a
charge of failure to prevent.
Despite the potential prosecutorial advantages inherent in the failure
to punish prong, prosecutors have declined to indict high-level com-
manders for their failures to punish because, under current international
and domestic law, the failure to punish is a relatively toothless doctrine.
More specifically, under both systems of law, the commander's failure to
punish is treated merely as a matter of dereliction of duty.25 Since dere-
liction of duty is a relatively meager offense, often ensuing in a sentence
26
of just a few months' confinement, prosecutors are inclined to look for
other ways to ensnare those high up in the chain of command. For ex-
ample, prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) increasingly rely on a kind of conspiratorial liability,
called joint criminal enterprise (JCE), in their efforts to achieve convic-
tions against high-level defendants.27 As other commentators have
argued, the problem with JCE is that it confers a great amount of discre-
tion on prosecutors to construe the joint enterprise very broadly-so
broadly that the doctrine threatens to convict innocents.28
A second reason to focus on the failure to punish offense, then, is
that this offense is both less subject to prosecutorial abuse, and a better
fit for the commander's crime. In particular, if the failure to punish
prong were rehabilitated in accordance with the mode of liability view,
as I urge here, only those commanders who bore an illicit connection to
their subordinates' atrocity would be convicted, and their conviction
24. For example, after twenty-four civilians were killed by U.S. Marines in Iraq, fami-
lies of the victims went to meet with the commanding officer to urge him to investigate the
killings and to take appropriate disciplinary action. See infra text accompanying note 137.
25. See, e.g., Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the
Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 619, 620
(2007).
26. See, e.g., Mynda G. Ohman, Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Tlitle 10: A Pro-
posal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 57 A.F. L. REV. 1, 59 (2005).
27. See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 107-08 (stating that, between June
25, 2001, and January 1, 2004, eighty-one percent of indictments before the ICTY charged
defendants on the basis of this doctrine); Osiel, Banality of Good, supra note 8, at 1766 (citing
the preference of prosecutors at the ICTY for use of the joint criminal enterprise (JCE) doc-
trine, rather than the doctrine of command responsibility, because it is so difficult to convict
under the latter).
28. See DRUMBL, supra note 17, at 39 (noting that some observers now scornfully jest
that JCE in fact stands for "'just convict everyone' "); Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at
108-10; Osiel, Banality of Good, supra note 8, at 1791, 1796-1802, 1854.
Winter 20091
Michigan Journal of International Law
would carry a moral taint that matches the nature of their contribution
better than does the substantive offense view. 9
Part I of this Article surveys the history of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an effort to critique the way in which international and
domestic military courts currently respond to commanders' failures to
punish. I argue that neither international nor domestic law is inexorably
led, as a matter of doctrine or theory, to the substantive offense view. In
Part II, I advance the Article's theory of harm, and argue that the failure
to punish can, under circumstances that I identify, inflict an expressive
harm that renders the commander a party to his subordinates' offense. In
the last section of Part H, I address the arguments of criminal law schol-
ars who have embraced the substantive offense view. Throughout the
Article, I provide detailed accounts of the ways in which commanders
have responded to the atrocities that I discuss. My purpose here is not
merely illustrative; the process of holding soldiers accountable for an
atrocity that they have committed has a truth-telling function that confers
some amount of solace on the atrocity's victims (or their families).30 The
commander who foregoes discipline thus deprives the victims of this
source of solace. Their stories are told here in an effort to fill the silence
that would otherwise reign.
I. WANTON KILLINGS AND MERE WRIST SLAPS
In December 2003, an Iraqi auto repair shop owner in the Sunni Tri-
angle made an obscene gesture as a platoon of U.S. soldiers passed by
his garage. The soldiers stopped and searched the shop. Although they
found nothing, their platoon commander ordered them to take the shop
owner to a bridge over the Tigris and throw him into the water. Appar-
ently, the soldiers' tactic worked, because the next time the platoon
passed by the auto repair shop, its owner greeted them with a polite
wave. A few weeks later, the same squad decided to throw two more
Iraqis off a bridge. This time, things did not turn out as well: one of the
Iraqis is believed to have drowned.3
29. For a less optimistic view of the power of command responsibility, grounded in the
theoretical possibility that organizations could be structured to thwart a claim of superior re-
sponsibility, see Osiel, Banality of Good, supra note 8, at 1780-83.
30. Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 94.
31. Dexter Filkins, The Fall of the Warrior King, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at E52.
Although the soldiers on the bridge that night report that they saw two figures emerge from
the water after both had been thrown in, one of the two Iraqis swears that the other never made
it out of the water. Army investigators have concluded that one of the two Iraqis did drown,
and the soldiers involved have been prosecuted for homicide. Id.
[Vol. 30:251
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The incident is remarkable not only for the brazen abuse it involves,
but also for the way in which it was handled by Lt. Col. Nathan Sas-
saman, the commander of the battalion that included the soldiers who
were present on the bridge that night. Sassaman claims not to have heard
about the first bridge-throwing incident, and to have learned about the
second incident only a few days after it occurred. Sassaman immediately
asked his deputy to investigate and, based on what his deputy told him,
Sassaman believed that no one had been harmed-that the stunt, though
"dumb," was not criminal.32 He decided not to report the incident to his
superior. When army investigators later started questioning Sassaman's
men about the incident, Sassaman urged his subordinates to tell the in-
vestigators everything that they wanted to know-except "the part about
the water."
33
Sassaman's cover-up eventually came to light. Although the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provides for the court-martial of a
commander who fails to investigate or punish an offense committed by
his subordinates, 3 Sassaman was subjected to the lesser disciplinary
route of non-judicial punishment.35 Sassaman received a written repri-
mand. He has since retired from the Army and hopes to pursue a career
as a football coach.36
The delicate handling of Sassaman's case is hardly unique.37 Al-
though abuses in the war in Iraq are now believed to be "common,
' 3 8
these often initially go unreported, and "almost always go unpunished."'3 9
Yet commanders bear a duty, under both domestic and international law,
to investigate alleged abuses committed by their subordinates and to
punish any abuses that they determine to have occurred. Thus, Army
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. As we shall see in Part II.B, infra, this offense is typically prosecuted under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice's (UCMJ) more general dereliction of duty provision. See
10 U.S.C. § 892 (2008).
35. See, e.g., Army Punishes Commanders in Drowning of Iraqi Civilian, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 8, 2004, at A5; Suzanne Goldberg, US to Try 20 More Troops for Abuse in
Iraq, GUARDIAN, Jan. 17, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/janl7/
iraq.usa.
36. Filkins, supra note 31.
37. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text. Sassaman was not the only one to
have been treated leniently. Staff Sgt. Tracy Perkins, who threw the two Iraqis into the water,
was convicted of assault and sentenced to six months confinement. His platoon officer, Lt.
Jack Saville, who had ordered his troops to throw the Iraqis into the water, pled guilty and was
sentenced to forty-five days of confinement. Filkins, supra note 31 ("Both men, in effect, were
convicted not of killing Zaydoon but of pushing him and Marwan into the water. Of getting
them wet."). See generally Ohman, supra note 26, at 98.
38. Chris Hedges & Laila AI-Arian, The Other War: Iraq Vets Bear Witness, NATION,
July 30, 2007, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070730/hedges/single.
39. Id.
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Field Manual 27-10 states that "[c]ommanding officers of United States
troops must ensure that war crimes committed by members of their
forces against enemy personnel are promptly and adequately punished.'40
Similarly, Article 87 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conven-
tions requires "any commander who is aware that subordinates or other
persons under his control are going to commit or have committed a
breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol ... to initiate disciplinary
or penal action against violators thereof."4' Nonetheless, commanders
who fail to discharge this duty are rarely prosecuted for their failures to
punish. Where they are prosecuted, we shall see that the law effectively
treats commanders' failures to punish with a proverbial slap on the wrist.
In this Part, I present a historical overview of the development of the
failure to punish prong of the doctrine of command responsibility in in-
ternational and domestic law. I argue that this history compels a far more
robust interpretation of command responsibility than that embodied in
today's doctrine. Part L.A offers a close doctrinal analysis of the interna-
tional criminal law case that inaugurated a revisionist reading of
command responsibility. Part I.B then turns to the domestic context, to
trace the disconnect between the authoritative texts governing the con-
duct of U.S. commanders and the lenient treatment that they, in fact,
receive.
A. The Failure to Punish in International Criminal Law
Contemporary command responsibility provisions criminalize a
commander's failure to punish an atrocity committed by his troops. The
language of Article 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY is representative." It
reads, in pertinent part,
40. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
507(b) (1956) [hereinafter ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10]. One can infer that a similar duty
exists for Navy officers, since they may be held responsible for their subordinates' act if they
"acquiesce" in it. See Paust, supra note 20, at 176-77; see also Articles of War, 14 U.S.C.
§ 2308(a) art. 54 (1916) (stating that a commander has a duty to ensure "to the utmost of his
power, redress of all abuses and disorders which may be committed by an officer or a soldier
under his command").
41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 87(3), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; see also Prosecutor v. Hadlihasanovid, Case
No. IT-01-47-T, Trial Judgment, 1777 (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Hadtihasanovi6 Trial
Judgment] ("[I]n international law, a commander has a duty to take the necessary and reason-
able measures to punish those who violate the laws or customs of war.").
42. Article 7(3) is identical to Article 6(3) of the statute governing the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d
mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). Both articles use the term "superior" in-
stead of the narrower "commander" because they contemplate not just military authorities but
also political and civilian leaders who fail to punish abuses committed by their subordinates.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, T 308 (June 30, 2006)
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[T]he fact that any of the [acts criminalized by] the present Stat-
ute was [sic] committed by a subordinate does not relieve his
superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reason-
able measures to ... punish the perpetrators thereof.
43
In other words, the statute makes criminal, inter alia," a superior's fail-
ure to punish an offense of his subordinates if he knew or had reason to
know that the offense had occurred. On the other hand, the statutory lan-
guage leaves unsettled the question of the nature of the offense for which
the commander is to be held criminally responsible. In particular, is the
failure to punish a ground for holding the commander criminally liable
for the atrocity committed by his troops, or is it an offense in its own
right? Under international law, we shall see, the doctrine has shifted
from the former to the latter.
In this Section, I critique this shift. I first describe the doctrine's
shadowy past. Next, I argue that this past prompted an over-correction
by the ICTY. Finally, I expose the unwarranted novelty and undesirable
implications wrought by the ICTY's interpretation.
1. Haunted by the Excesses of the Post-World War II
War Crimes Trials
As we have seen, contemporary command responsibility statutes
punish commanders if they "knew or had reason to know" that their
troops had committed atrocities and failed to punish those atrocities.
[hereinafter Ori Trial Judgment]. Article 28 of the Rome Statute also contains a failure to
punish clause, although it explicitly distinguishes, in separate provisions each with its own
mental state requirement, military commanders from political and civilian leaders. Rome Stat-
ute, supra note 5, art. 28. Although I anticipate that the critique that I advance translates to the
context of civilian leadership, I restrict my focus to the military context since I am interested,
in particular, in probing the normative dimensions of the military command structure. For the
view that Article 28 of the Rome Statute is narrower than the ICTY and ICTR formulations,
because Article 28 makes the commander liable for failure to punish only if the commander is
also guilty of failing properly to control his troops, and that failure led to the troops' atrocity,
see Volker Nerlich, Superior Responsibility Under Article 28 ICC Statute: For What Exactly Is
the Superior Held Responsible?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 665, 678-79 (2007).
43. ICTY Statute, supra note 21, art. 7(3).
44. The full text of Article 7(3) criminalizes not only a commander's failure to punish
but also his failure to prevent an offense that he knew, or had reason to know, his subordinate
was about to commit. See id. Since this Article contemplates only those offenses about which
the commander is ignorant before or during their occurrence, and for which the commander's
ignorance is not itself culpable, I do not consider the "failure to prevent" prong of Article 7(3)
here. For a critical discussion of the failure to prevent prong, see Mirjan Damagka, The
Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 461-67 (2001); Danner &
Martinez, supra note 17, at 124-31.
45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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Much has been written about the "knew or had reason to know" formula-
46 thetion, and indeed ICTY itself wrestled with the term until it reached
a conclusive interpretation in Prosecutor v. Blaskic. 4 ' The ICTY's strug-
gle has been attributed to "the ghost of Yamashita,"4'8 a reference to the
U.S. Supreme Court case that affirmed a death sentence for General To-
moyuki Yamashita,49 commanding general of the Imperial Japanese
Army in the Philippines during World War II. Yamashita was found
criminally liable for acts of rape and murder committed by troops osten-
sibly under his command.0 At his trial before a military commission, no
evidence was presented to establish that Yamashita possessed actual
knowledge of the atrocities committed by his subordinates, and he con-
tended that his chain of communication had been disrupted. Nonetheless,
the commission found him guilty, and the Supreme Court affirmed its
verdict, on the supposition that Yamashita must have known that the
crimes in question were so widespread that only willful blindness could
have prevented him from actually knowing about their occurrence."
Historians of the case have since argued that the situation on the
ground may well have prevented Yamashita from acquiring the knowl-
conviction. 2 Even more problematic was thatedge presupposed by his co v ct o . E v n m r r b e m t c w s t a
the United States itself had disrupted Yamashita's lines of communica-
tion. Thus, Justice Murphy offered this searing characterization of
Yamashita's conviction by a U.S. military commission:
46. See, e.g., Bonafd, supra note 7, at 605-07; Dama9ka, supra note 44, at 461-62;
Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 125-30; Arthur T. O'Reilly, Command Responsibility: A
Call To Realign the Doctrine with Principles, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 91-94 (2004).
Mark Osiel has written that "[v]irtually all academic discussion focuses on the mens rea re-
quirement" Osiel, Banality of Good, supra note 8, at 1774. But see Danner & Martinez, supra
note 17, at 130-31 (discussing at length the doctrinal requirement of a superior-subordinate
relationship).
47. Blaiki6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 17. That decision held that the "'had reason
to know'" clause encompassed only situations in which "information was available" to the
commander "which would have put him on notice of offences by subordinates." Id. T 62. For
an excellent overview of the evolution of the mens rea requirement under Article 7(3), see
Martinez, supra note 7, at 654-59.
48. Martinez, supra note 7, at 641; cf Bonafd, supra note 7, at 601 (contending that the
ICTY and ICTR are reacting against the interpretations of command responsibility that were
wielded by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals).
49. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
50. For an excellent overview of the Yamashita case, see William H. Parks, Command
Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REv. 1, 20-37 (1973).
51. U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, in 4 LAW RE-
PORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 35, 37 (1948).
52. See, e.g., Laurie Barber, The Yamashita War Crimes Trial Revisited, 1 WAIMILHIST,
Sept. 1998, http:llwww.waikato.ac.nzlwfass/subjectslhistory/waimilhist/1998/wmh3.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2009).
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We, the victorious American forces, have done everything possi-
ble to destroy and disorganize your lines of communication,
your effective control of your personnel, your ability to wage
war .... We will judge the discharge of your duties by the dis-
organization which we ourselves created in large part. Our
standards of judgment are whatever we wish to make them.53
In light of the injustice so forcefully conveyed in Justice Murphy's
dissent, Yamashita might well be characterized as the Korematsu of in-
ternational criminal law decisions 4 Justice Rutledge, who also dissented
in the case, privately referred to the majority opinion as "'the worst in
the [C]ourt's history, not even barring Dred Scott."'
But although Yamashita is rightly reviled, its spurious mens rea ele-
ment was not at issue in the ICTY cases in which the Tribunal articulated
and adopted a novel construction of command responsibility. Trial
chambers in those cases found that the defendants had actual knowledge
of their subordinates' abuses. Nonetheless, the ghost of Yamashita con-
tinues to haunt jurists.
2. Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute Interpreted
Enver Hadihasanovi6 was the Commander of the 3rd Corps of the
Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) in the summer of 1993,
when the units under his command launched a series of heavy attacks
against the Croatian Defence Council (HVO).56 Those attacks resulted in
the unlawful detention and abuse of Bosnian Croats and Serbs.57 Mladen
Havranek, an HVO soldier, was among those detained." He was held in
the basement of a furniture warehouse, with little food and no function-
ing toilets. A sewage pipe had burst, leaving pools of excrement-filled
standing water.59 Each night, the soldiers guarding the furniture ware-
house would call for five or six detainees one by one, whom they
proceeded to beat with wooden implements, clubs, and iron rods60 When
53. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 34-35 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
54. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (finding no constitutional infir-
mity in the internment of Japanese Americans during World War H).
55. Richard Brust, Setting Precedent in Two Wars: How Justice Stevens Turned 60-
Year-Old Dissents into Major Rulings in the War on Terrorism, 93 A.B.A. J. 48, 51 (2007)
(quoting a private letter from Justice Rutledge to a colleague, reprinted in JOHN M. FERREN,
SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE
(2004)). For the view that the contemporary understanding of command responsibility in in-
ternational law embodies the Yamashita standard, see Smidt, supra note 13, at 206-07.
56. Had~ihasanovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 41, 1734, 1742-45.
57. Id. (H 1614-15.
58. Id. 1620.
59. Id. 1597.
60. Id. 1598.
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the guards wanted to take a break, they forced the prisoners to beat one
another.6' On August 5, 1993, Havranek was among those whose names
were called.62 From the basement, the other detainees could hear Havra-
nek moaning and screaming and begging the guards to stop beating
him.63 He lost consciousness shortly after he was returned to the base-
ment, and died later that night.64
Hadihasanovi6 was apprised of Havranek's death about two weeks
later." He also learned that the soldiers who had beaten and killed
Havranek had been disciplined, but that no criminal prosecution was be-
66ing pursued. Had~ihasanovi6 expressed his satisfaction with this
response.6 ' At his trial, the ICTY found that mere disciplinary measures
were insufficient to address Havranek's murder68 and that Had~ihasano-
vi6 had therefore failed to fulfill his duty to punish.69 For the first time in
its history, the ICTY convicted a commander solely for his failure to
punish.70
This important step was, however, undercut by the ICTY's under-
standing of the nature of Hadihasanovi's offense. Had~ihasanovi6 was
not found liable for Havranek's murder; instead, he was convicted of the
separate offense of failing to punish.7' In other words, the ICTY con-
strued the wrong that Hadlihasanovi6 had perpetrated as a species of
dereliction of duty. The Hadtihasanovi6 Chamber arrived at this con-
struction by choosing to adopt the analysis proffered by another ICTY
Chamber, in Prosecutor v. Halilovi .n
Halilovi6, decided in November 2005, marked the first time that a
commander faced counts of an indictment predicated solely on his fail-
ure to prevent or punish an offense, rather than his instigating or
ordering an offense.73 The Halilovi6 Chamber thus addressed at great
61. Id. 1603.
62. Id. 1600.
63. Id. 1616.
64. Id. 1600, 1616-17.
65. Id. U 1753-55.
66. Id. 1752-53.
67. Id. ( 1753, 1770.
68. Id. 1777.
69. Id.
70. Had2ihasanovi6 was not the first to be charged before the ICTY solely for his fail-
ure to punish. That distinction belongs to Sefer Halilovi6. See infra note 72 and accompanying
text.
71. See Hadihasanovie Trial Judgment, supra note 41, U 1777-80.
72. See Halilovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 19.
73. In Prosecutor v. Strugar, the defendant was convicted solely under Article 7(3) of
the ICTY Statute, although he had been charged under both Articles 7(1) and 7(3) for the same
underlying offense. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01 -42-T, Trial Judgment, 2 (Jan. 31,
2005). Other prior cases involving a failure to prevent and/or punish arose in cases in which
the defendant also bore causal responsibility for the offense that he had failed to prevent
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length the question of whether the failure to punish was a mode of liabil-
ity that would render the commander criminally responsible for his
subordinates' offense, or, instead, a sui generis crime flowing from his
dereliction of duty.7 4 To answer that question, the Trial Chamber mar-
shaled an extensive history of command responsibility. In what follows, I
summarize the Halilovi6 Trial Chamber's analysis with a view to expos-
ing the shaky support on which it relied for its ultimate conclusion.
The Chamber largely based its analysis on post-World War II case
law." The Chamber first invoked four cases arising in the immediate af-
termath of the war. According to its own reading, the Chamber
acknowledged that three of these cases held that a commander can be
held liable for the offenses of his subordinates if he fails to prevent or
punish them; 6 the last case is silent with respect to the offense for which
the commander should be punished, stating only that "he has failed in
his performance of his duty as a commander and must be punished. 77 As
such, that case leaves open the possibility that the crime for which the
commander ought to be punished is the atrocity of his subordinates,
rather than his dereliction of duty. Nonetheless, in a marked understate-
ment, the Halilovie Chamber concluded from this set of cases that the
post-World War II case law is "not uniform in its determination as to the
nature of the responsibility arising from the concept of command re-
sponsibility.""
and/or punish, because he ordered or instigated that offense. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delali6 et
al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment (Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Celebici Appeals
Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/I-A, Appeals Judgment (Mar. 24,
2000). Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute criminalizes the ordering or instigating of an offense
by a commander, while Article 7(3) criminalizes his failure to prevent or punish. In Prosecutor
v. Blagki6, the ICTY determined that a commander could not be found guilty under both Arti-
cles 7(1) and 7(3) for the same offense; instead, only Article 7(1) could be used as a ground
for criminal liability, with a commander's failure to prevent and/or punish functioning as an
aggravating factor at sentencing. See Blagki6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 17.
74. Halilovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 19, 142.
75. Id. 4M 42-53. Before turning to the post-World War 11 case law, the Halilovi
Chamber first quickly adverted to the early history of command responsibility, beginning with
a 1439 order of Charles VII of France, which held that "a captain 'shall be responsible for the
offence as if he had committed it himself and shall be punished in the same way as the of-
fender would have been.'" Id. 40 n.94. Nonetheless, because the Halilovi6 Chamber based
its interpretation on post-World War H doctrine, I do not consider the earlier history here (al-
though it strongly supports the mode of liability view).
76. Halilovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 19, 47 & n. 113 (quoting United States v.
Soemu Toyoda, Official Transcript of Record of Trial, at 5006 (Int'l Mil. Trib. for the Far East
1949)).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Halilovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 19, 48.
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The Chamber next turned to the reports submitted to the Security
Council prior to the adoption of the ICTY's governing statute. 9 The
Chamber began by noting that a "reading of the Secretary General's Re-
port concerning Article 7(3) does not exclude the possibility that
command responsibility under the Statute of the Tribunal may be re-
sponsible for dereliction of duty."s It then cited a report by the
Commission of Experts, which stated that superiors are "'individually
responsible for a war crime or crime against humanity committed by a
subordinate,' "" from which the Chamber inferred that "the Commission
of Experts may have considered that Article 7(3) attached responsibility
to commanders for the crimes of their subordinates."82 The Halilovie
Chamber also noted that "the Trial Chamber Judgment in Celebici relied
upon the report of the Secretary-General to find that command responsi-
bility under Article 7(3) attaches responsibility for the crimes of
subordinates, a finding that was affirmed on appeal, 4 as the Halilovi
Chamber acknowledged.85 Finally, the panel invoked the International
Law Commission Commentary on Article 6 of the ICTY Statute, 6
which, according to the panel's reading of it, "considered that a military
commander may be held criminally responsible for the unlawful conduct
of his subordinates if he contributes indirectly to the commission of a
crime by failing to prevent or repress that crime."'
The only source cited by the Halilovi6 Chamber that could support a
substantive offense reading of Article 7(3) emerged from the dissenting
portion of Judge Shahabuddeen's opinion in an interlocutory appeal de-
cision in the HadihasanoviW case. Judge Shahabuddeen stated that he
would "'prefer to interpret the provision as making the commander
79. The Halilovi Chamber paused briefly first to consider Articles 86 and 87 of Addi-
tional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which, as the Chamber rightfully noted, are
"silent as to the nature of command responsibility-that is, whether it is responsibility for
dereliction of duty or responsibility for the crimes of subordinates." See id. 149.
80. Id. 51 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. 51 n.1 17. For the text that footnote 117 of the Halilovi6 opinion accompanied,
see infra text accompanying note 80.
84. The Appeals Chamber held that, where a superior has effective control over his
subordinates, "he would be held responsible for the commission of the crimes if he failed to
exercise such abilities of control." Oelebici Appeals Judgment, supra note 73, 198 (emphasis
added).
85. HaliloviW Trial Judgment, supra note 19, 53.
86. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Ses-
sion, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in
[1996] 2Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l.
87. Halilovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 19, j 52.
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guilty for failing in his supervisory capacity to take the necessary correc-
tive action .... ,.88
In sum, on the basis of the doctrinal history that Halilovi6 invoked,
there is overwhelming support for the mode of liability view. Indeed, as
the Hadihasanovi6 Chamber subsequently noted, "The analysis by the
Chamber in Halilovi6 shows that most Chambers of [the ICTY] have
determined that a superior is responsible for the acts of his subordinates
under Article 7(3) of the Statute."89 Nonetheless, the Halilovi6 Chamber
arrived at the remarkable conclusion that Article 7(3) does not render a
commander liable for the offenses of his subordinates; instead, it crimi-
nalizes the substantive offense of failing to prevent or punish. The
Halilovi6 Chamber stated:
The Trial Chamber finds that under Article 7(3) command re-
sponsibility is responsibility for an omission.. . . This omission
is culpable because international law imposes an affirmative
duty on superiors to prevent and punish crimes committed by
their subordinates .... A commander is responsible not as
though he had committed the crime himself .... 90
There remained, of course, the niggling matter that prior ICTY case
law routinely speaks of holding a commander criminally responsible
"for the acts of his subordinates." 9' The HaliloviW Chamber was, how-
ever, undaunted as it insisted that the phrase
88. Id. 53 (citing Prosecutor v. Hadlihasanovi6, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision
on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 32
(July 16, 2003) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) [hereinafter, Had~ihasanovi6 Interlocutory
Appeal]). The cited statement of Judge Shahabuddeen's opinion is drawn from the portion of
his opinion in which he dissents from the majority. The majority opinion does not comment on
the question that occupied the Halilovid Trial panel-viz., whether Article 7(3) criminalizes a
substantive offense or confers a mode of liability.
89. Hadihasanovi6 Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 88, $ 72.
90. Halilovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 19, 54. It is significant that the Chamber
acquitted Halilovid on the ground that he lacked effective control during the period in which
his subordinates committed the atrocities in question, and so did not have the material ability
to punish them. See id. $ 746, 750-53. The acquittal outcome should have been sufficient,
then, to quell whatever unease the Chamber had about interpreting Article 7(3) as a mode of
liability. The fact that the Chamber nonetheless was at pains to repudiate that interpretation
underscores the strength of the panel's aversion to rendering a commander criminally liable
for the acts of his subordinates solely because he fails to punish them.
Halilovid's acquittal has since been affirmed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber. See Prose-
cutor v. Halilovi6, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Appeals Judgment (Oct. 16, 2007). The appellate
decision addressed only the prosecution's challenge to the Trial Chamber's finding that
Halilovi6 lacked effective control over his subordinates. Since the Appeals Chamber upheld
this finding, it declined to consider the prosecution's challenge to the Trial Chamber's treat-
ment of Article 7(3)'s failure to punish prong. See id. It 216-17.
91. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Obrenovid, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment,
40 (Dec. 10, 2003) (finding that defendant, the Acting Commander or Deputy
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"for the acts of his subordinates" . . . does not mean that the
commander shares the same responsibility as the subordinates
who committed the crimes, but rather that because of the crimes
committed by his subordinates, the commander should bear re-
sponsibility for his failure to act.92
In other words, the otherwise straightforward phrase "criminally re-
sponsible for the acts of his subordinates" is, on the ICTY's reading of it,
elliptical for something like "criminally responsible in light of the acts of
his subordinates, which he failed to prevent or punish."
3. The Novelty and Implications of the ICTY's Reading
The foregoing reconstruction of Halilovi suggests that the case tor-
tures the history that it marshals in order to arrive at the substantive
offense view. But, there is both more ancient history and more authorita-
tive doctrine that tends to the alternative interpretation.
For example, scholars have traced a conception of command respon-
sibility in line with the mode of liability view as far back as Sun Tzu's
writings on military discipline in 500 B.C.9 3 The history picks up again
in the early 1400s, and then again at the time of the Revolutionary War
in the United States.94 In the aftermath of World War II, when there was a
relative explosion in pronouncements about command responsibility,
most of the Allied States enacted command responsibility provisions that
expressly adopted the mode of liability view. Article 3 of the Law of Au-
gust 2, 1947, of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, on the Suppression of
War Crimes is representative. It reads, in pertinent part: "[T]he following
may be charged according to the [circumstances], as co-authors or ac-
complices in the crimes and delicts set out in Article 1 of the present
Law: superiors in rank who have tolerated the criminal activities of their
subordinates . .. ,9' The Netherlands, France, China, and Canada passed
substantively similar laws.96
At the time that Halilovi6 was decided, there existed implicit evi-
dence supporting the mode of liability view within ICTY case law itself.
Commander/Chief of Staff, was "criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates when
he knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were about to commit criminal acts or
had done so and he failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts
or to punish the perpetrators thereof" (emphasis added)); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No.
IT-95-14/I-T, Trial Judgment, 67 (June 25, 1999) ("A superior is held responsible for the
acts of his subordinates if he did not prevent the perpetration of the crimes of his subordinates
or punish them for the crimes.") (emphasis added).
92. Halilovi Trial Judgment, supra note 19, 54.
93. See Martinez, supra note 7, at 661; Parks, supra note 50, at 3.
94. Martinez, supra, note 7, at 661.
95. U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, supra note 51, at 87 (emphasis added).
96. See Parks, supra note 50, at 18-19.
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97In Blaskic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that it is duplicative to
convict a commander both for ordering or instigating an offense (a viola-
tion of Article 7(1)), 98 as well as failing to prevent or punish that offense
(a violation of Article 7(3)).99 As the ICTY stated in Prosecutor v. Krsti6,
"any responsibility under Article 7(3) is subsumed under Article 7(l). ' 0
Yet, if Article 7(3) contemplated the substantive offense of dereliction of
duty, there would be no duplication in convictions rendered under both
Articles 7(1) and 7(3). In other words, the Appeals Chamber's position
in Blagki6 makes sense only if Article 7(3) is intended to make the com-
mander criminally liable for his troops' atrocity.'0 '
Taken together, the foregoing is intended to establish that the weight
of history and precedent lies on the side of the mode of liability view."
Nonetheless, although none of the judges comprising the Halilovi6 panel
sat on the Hadihasanovi6 panel, Had~ihasanovi6 followed Halilovi in
adopting the substantive offense view.
The difference in interpretations is not merely semantic. First, the
construction of Article 7(3) as the substantive offense of dereliction of
duty, rather than as a mode of liability for the underlying atrocities, en-
tails a significantly less severe sentence. As the Had~ihasanoviW
Chamber intoned,
the sui generis nature of command responsibility under Article
7(3) of the Statute may justify the fact that the sentencing scale
applied to those Accused convicted solely on the basis of Article
7(1) of the Statute, or cumulatively under Articles 7(1) and 7(3),
97. Blagkic Appeals Judgment, supra note 17, 90.
98. Article 7(1) states, "A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or oth-
erwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in
articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime." ICTY
Statute, supra note 21, art. 7(1).
99. Blafki6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 17, 91-92.
100. Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, 605 (Aug. 2, 2001).
101. Chantal Meloni adduces other considerations that demonstrate the extent to which
the dereliction of duty interpretation is strained. First, she notes that a commander can be
convicted under Article 7(3) only if his troops actually commit an offense. Meloni, supra note
25, at 628. If the commander is, say, derelict in his duty to prevent, but someone else acts to
prevent the soldiers' intended crime, the commander will not be charged with dereliction. Id.
Second, the commander's sentence will turn, first and foremost, not on the extent of his dere-
liction but instead on the gravity of his subordinates' offense. Id. at 632. Notwithstanding
these considerations, Meloni still rejects the mode of liability view, as we shall see in Part In.
See infra text accompanying note 196.
102. For yet another indication that Halilovi6 turned settled doctrine on its head, con-
sider that, just ten months before Halilovi6 was handed down, Danner and Martinez had
offered this description of the portent of Article 7(3): "It is important to realize that, under
command responsibility, the commander is convicted of the actual crime committed by his
subordinate and not of some lesser form of liability, such as dereliction of duty." Danner &
Martinez, supra note 17, at 121.
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is not applied to those convicted solely under Article 7(3), in
cases where nothing would allow that responsibility to be as-
similated or linked to individual responsibility under Article
7( 1).103
Thus, in Prosecutor v. Ori,' 4 a second case to follow Halilovi, the de-
fendant was sentenced to two years in prison, rather than the
eighteen years recommended by the prosecution, which had urged a
mode of liability reading.' 5
Orik is instructive for another reason: it extended the interpretation
of Article 7(3) articulated in Halilovi6 and followed in HadihasanoviW
to a case in which the defendant was convicted for failing to prevent his
subordinates' atrocities. In OriK, troops under the command of the de-
fendant routinely abused Bosnian Serbs whom they had detained, and at
least four detainees died as a result. The ICTY Trial Chamber found that,
in his position as Commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces in Sre-
brenica, Ori6 knew or had reason to know about these acts of
mistreatment,0 and that he had effective control over those who could
have prevented them.' 7 The Ori6 Chamber refused to countenance Orit's
claim that his attentions were diverted as a result of the deteriorating
military situation: "[A]s a general rule, the treatment of prisoners in
armed conflict, including their physical and mental integrity, cannot be
relegated to a position of importance inferior to other considerations,
military or otherwise, however important they may be.... ,,o0
103. Hadihasanovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 41, 2076; see also Orie Trial Judg-
ment, supra note 42, 724 (stating that trial chambers have "greater flexibility" when
sentencing a defendant convicted solely for his failure to prevent or punish an offense, relative
to the defendant who is convicted of instigating or ordering that offense).
104. OriK Trial Judgment, supra note 42, 293, 724. The judges presiding in OriK were
different from those presiding in Halilovie and Had~ihasanovi6, which suggests an emerging
consensus in ICTY jurisprudence.
105. See Meloni, supra note 25, at 621 n.7 (citing Prosecutor v. Orid, Case No. IT-03-68-
A, Prosecution's Appeal Brief, 10 (Oct. 16, 2006)). Hadlihasanovid received a single sen-
tence of five years, which resulted from his convictions not only for the failure to punish
Havranek's murder, but also for the failures to prevent or punish atrocities committed by his
subordinates at the Zenica Music School, as well as other failures to prevent or punish. Hadti-
hasanovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 41, 9H 2085, 1240. It is thus difficult to discern what
portion of Had~ihasanov5's sentence resulted solely from his failure to punish Havranek's
murder.
Other commentators have noted that the ad hoc tribunals, and especially the ICTY, have,
in general, dispensed sentences significantly lower-sometimes bafflingly lower-than those
imposed by municipal courts for crimes on a much smaller scale. See, e.g., Drumbl, Collective
Violence, supra note 15, at 578-79; Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 1, at 684-89.
106. Ori6 Trial Judgment, supra note 42, 1 560.
107. Id. H9 567-68.
108. Id. 559.
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The Ori6 Chamber recognized that commanders bear an obligation
to prevent and punish because doing so can avert imminent crimes and
deter future crimes.' °9 But, the Ori6 Chamber nonetheless refused to con-
strue OriCs failure to prevent as a causal contributor to the acts of abuse
described above."' Its refusal was grounded not in the facts of the case,
but instead in its understanding of the nature of Article 7(3). If Article
7(3) were to require causation, the Chamber reasoned, there would be no
difference between Articles 7(1) and 7(3). As such, the Chamber con-
cluded, Article 7(3) could be saved from superfluity only if the Chamber
ignored the material harm caused by the failure to prevent, and construed
that failure solely as a substantive offense."'
The Chamber's argument is deeply flawed. In fact, causation could
be an element of both Articles 7(1) and 7(3) without rendering the latter
redundant, for each could still capture a different offense with a different
mental state. In particular, Article 7(1) could cover instances of ordering
or instigating an atrocity, where intent is implicit in the act requirement,
while the failure to prevent prong of Article 7(3) could cover instances of
reckless or willful omissions. Moreover, even if one is convinced that the
failure to punish prong is properly understood as a substantive offense,
there is no reason to require that the failure to prevent be understood in
this way as well.
Ori6 may thus have been the unlikely beneficiary of the Tribunal's
faulty reasoning and overblown concerns about superfluity. As a result,
although the Chamber found that Ori6 knew that captives detained by his
subordinates were routinely beaten, sometimes to death, and that he had
failed to prevent this mistreatment, it convicted Ori6 solely of neglecting
his duty, and did not hold him responsible for the underlying offenses." 2
Ori6 was given credit for time served, and released shortly after his case
was decided.
The point here is not that Ori6 or Hadlihasanovi6 necessarily de-
served a more severe sentence. I shall argue in Part II that the failure to
109. Id. 1338.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id. 724. John Darley has provided reason to be especially skeptical of a claim,
like Orid's, that delegating authority to oversee and discipline is a sufficient means of
discharging one's role as an authority. Delegation of authority, Darley argues, is a way
for superiors to simultaneously allow the evil acts of their subordinates to continue, while
insulating themselves from liability. See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Indi-
viduals into Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS
ETHICS 1, 32 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); cf David Luban, Alan
Strudler & David Wasserman, Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 2348 (1992) (describing bureaucratization as a mechanism through which institutional
actors insulate themselves, by dividing the traditional elements of an offense between them,
such that no one actor can satisfy them all).
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punish grounds criminal liability for the underlying offense only when
that failure communicates that the victims of the underlying offense did
not merit better treatment than they received. Since we do not know
whether Ori6's or HadlihasanoviCs failure to punish was propelled by
such a belief, we are not in a position to judge the particular treatment of
each before the ICTY
But, there is a broader lesson to be drawn from their trials. The
ICTY chambers deciding their cases were not compelled, as a matter of
precedent, history, or logic, to interpret the offense criminalized in Arti-
cle 7(3) simply as a dereliction of duty, and the adoption of this
interpretation has had, and will continue to have, significant implications
for the gravity of the sentence imposed on a commander convicted under
the command responsibility doctrine in international law."3
I defer a consideration of the normative significance of failing to
punish to Part II. First, I survey command responsibility's strange trajec-
tory within domestic law.
B. The Failure to Punish in U.S. Military Law
We have seen that the construction of command responsibility under
international law has undergone a dramatic and explicit about-face in the
ICTY jurisprudence. The situation in domestic law is both subtler and
more sinister.
This Section aims to demonstrate that construing the failure to inves-
tigate or punish solely as a matter of dereliction of duty, rather than as a
ground of criminal liability for the underlying offense, is no more justi-
fied in domestic law than in international law. To that end, I first describe
the history of command responsibility in domestic military law. I next
invoke the Haditha incident as an example of the current understanding
of command responsibility as the substantive offense of dereliction of
duty. To fully grasp the operation of command responsibility within do-
mestic law, however, we must inquire not only into doctrine and history,
but also into the institutional dynamics affecting military justice. The
latter inquiry is necessary because of the peculiar shape of U.S. military
justice: Whereas international war crimes are tried before international
tribunals independent of the militaries whose members commit these
crimes, U.S. military atrocities are tried by the military itself, and, as we
113. International criminal law consists, in part, of the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals,
which are probative sources of law for the ICC. Thus, we can assume that the ICTY's interpre-
tation of command responsibility will influence the ICC's construction of the doctrine. See,
e.g., Nerlich, supra note 42, at 682 ("The finding of the ICTY Trial Chamber
in Hadtihasanovi6 and Kubura thus sheds light on an important aspect of superior responsibil-
ity that, to a certain extent, may be also of relevance to the interpretation and application of
Article 28 [of the Rome Statute].").
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shall see, commanders can exert much control over who gets prosecuted,
and for which offenses. A study into command culture can thus help us
glean the factors propelling a commander to uphold or forsake his obli-
gation to punish; this study can also throw into relief the perils of
treating the failure to investigate and punish leniently. I undertake this
study in the last sub-section, using the My Lai massacre as an illustra-
tion.
1. The Long-Standing View of the Failure to Punish
as a Mode of Liability
An understanding of command responsibility along the lines of the
mode of liability view predates the nation's founding and has been a fix-
ture of U.S. law for most of its history. On the eve of the Revolutionary
War, the Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay adopted the Massa-
chusetts Articles of War, the eleventh article of which provided:
Every officer commanding, in quarters, or on a march, shall keep
good order, and to the utmost of his power, redress all such
abuses or disorders which may be committed by any Officer or
Soldier under his command; if upon complaint made to him of
Officers or Soldiers beating or otherwise ill-treating any person,
or committing any kind of riots to the disquieting of the inhabi-
tants of this Continent, he, the said commander, who shall refuse
or omit to see Justice done to this offender or offenders, and
reparation made to the party or parties injured, as soon as the of-
fender's wages shall enable him or them, upon due proof
thereof, be punished, as ordered by General Court-Martial in
such manner as if he himself had committed the crimes or disor-
ders complained of.114
In other words, the crime of the commanding officer's subordinates
would attach to the officer unless he sought to punish his subordinates
and ensure that the victims' injuries were redressed. An identical provi-
sion was included first in Article XII of the American Articles of War,
enacted June 30, 1775, and re-enacted as section IX of the American Ar-
ticles of War of 1776 on September 20, 1776." 5 Thus, from the very
outset of this nation, commanders faced criminal liability for their sub-
ordinates' offense if they failed adequately to punish it.
The mode of liability view of command responsibility has persisted
through two world wars, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam, to the
114. Articles of War, Provisional Congress of Mass. Bay, April 5, 1775, quoted in Parks,
supra note 50, at 5 (emphasis added).
115. Parks, supra note 50, at 5.
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present day."' In addition, it is clear that the United States imposes the
mode of liability view on enemy combatants whom it tries before courts-
martial. As the Military Commissions Act of 2006 states,
Any person is punishable as a principal under this chapter who
... is a superior commander who, with regard to acts punishable
under this chapter, knew, had reason to know, or should have
known, that a subordinate was about to commit such acts or had
done so and [the superior] failed to take the necessary and rea-
sonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.'7
More generally, some commentators have argued that the U.S. Con-
stitution and early Supreme Court opinions evidence the Framers'
intention that customary international law be binding on the United
States. 18 On that argument, the international doctrine of command re-
sponsibility, which, as we saw above, has traditionally construed the
116. For example, Army Field Manual 27-10 states, "In some cases, military command-
ers may be responsible for war crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces, or other persons subject to their control." ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 40,
501. That provision goes on to explain that the commander will bear responsibility for "mas-
sacres and atrocities" committed by his troops if "he has actual knowledge, or should have
knowledge ... that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have
committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps ... to punish
violators thereof." Id.; see also Paust, supra note 20, at 176-77 (citing a 1955 Law of Navy
Warfare provision substantially similar to Army Field Manual 27-10); Smidt, supra note 13, at
185 n. 125 (stating that, as of the writing of 2000, Army Field Manual 27-10 was still current
Army doctrine). Writing in 1982, the Chief of the Appellate Defense Division of the Army
Judge Advocate General's Corps stated:
Command criminal responsibility goes beyond personal felonious acts. It assumes
that a commander does not issue illegal orders or in some way personally direct or
supervise a prohibited activity; such conduct would make the commander a per-
sonal participant. It is not personal criminal activity but criminal responsibility for
the actions of subordinates or for command decisions affecting others.
William G. Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard, 97
MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1982). Similarly, in 1988, the Army declared that commanders are "respon-
sible for everything their command does or fails to do." U.S. Dep't of the Army, Reg. 600-20,
Army Command Policy, ch. 2-lb (Mar. 30, 1988); see also U.S. Dep't of Defense, Dir.
5100.77, DOD Law of War Program, I 4.1-4.3 (Dec. 9, 1998).
117. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 950(q), 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
118. Smidt, supra note 13, at 212-14; see also ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note
40, T 511 (warning that "[t]he fact that domestic law does not impose a penalty for an act
which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed
the act from responsibility under international law"); Paust, supra note 20, at 106-07 (citing
an 1865 letter from the U.S. Attorney General to the President that states that Congress has the
power to define, but not to make or abrogate, the law of nations as applied to the United States
and that even where Congress does not exercise this power, the law of nations is nonetheless
binding on the U.S. government).
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failure to punish as a mode of liability,"9 would apply domestically. As in
international criminal law, the difference in domestic law between the
two ways of construing a commander's failure to punish-again, as a
substantive offense or mode of liability-is of great material conse-
quence. According to the UCMJ, the maximum penalty for willful
dereliction of duty is six months of confinement per offense; 20 by com-
parison, torture and war crimes carry twenty- and thirty-year maximum
sentences under federal law.'2 ' The upshot of the substantive offense
view is also gravely symbolic. As one commentator notes with respect to
the UCMJ's dereliction of duty provision, "[a]n article that is routinely
used to prosecute abuse of the government travel card hardly contains
the inherent stigma deserving of a war crime."'' 22 Dereliction of duty
nonetheless remains the favored response to U.S. commanders who fail
to punish an atrocity of their troops.
2. The Failure to Investigate and Punish at Haditha
In November 2005, a bomb detonated by Iraqi insurgents struck a
U.S. humvee carrying U.S. Marines on the outskirts of the town of
Haditha. The bomb killed one Marine, and his fellow Marines proceeded
to shoot and kill twenty-four civilians, including women and children,
in what some believe was a retaliatory shooting rampage. The next
day, a Marine spokesman issued a statement declaring that the Iraqis had
died as a result of the roadside bomb.
25
119. Halilovi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 19, N 54-55.
120. See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2008). Ironically, one of the goals behind the drafting of the
UCMJ, which functions as the military's substantive and procedural criminal law, was to "in-
creas[e] public confidence in military justice." GENEROUS, supra note 11, at 34. It is hard to
see how the lenient treatment of U.S. military superiors advances this goal. For an overview of
the history of U.S. military law prior to the drafting of the UCMJ, see, for example, WILLIAM
B. AYCOCK & SEYMOUR W. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILI-
TARY JUSTICE 9-15 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1955) (1951).
121. Ohman, supra note 26, at 59. The purpose of Mynda Ohman's article is to bring to
light a more general problem with U.S. military justice-viz., its inability to charge as war
crimes the most serious atrocities committed in the course of war. See id. Broadly, the UCMJ
can incorporate crimes that it does not explicitly specify only if those crimes are not punish-
able by death. Since, under the War Crimes Act, genocide, torture, rape, and other serious war
crimes are punishable by death under some circumstances, the UCMJ cannot incorporate
these. The result is that military personnel who commit these crimes can only be charged with
their common crime counterparts. But genocide, for example, is not your garden-variety mur-
der, and torture leading to death is not common aggravated assault. See id.
122. See id. at 59 (footnote omitted).
123. Bing West, The Road to Haditha, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 2006, at 95, avail-
able at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200610/haditha.
124. See Tim McGirk, One Morning in Haditha, TIME, Mar. 27, 2007, at 34, 35, avail-
able at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1174649,00.html.
125. Id.
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That version of the Haditha incident persisted until Time magazine
received a videotape suggesting that the Marines may have been
engaging in a cover-up. 2 6 When Time contacted the Marine spokesman
to see if he wanted to amend his earlier statement, he laughed off the
videotape as "Al Qaeda propaganda."'' 7
The Marines finally decided, some three months later, to pursue an
investigation into what had happened on that November day. Investiga-
tors learned not only that the Iraqi civilians had been killed by Marines
and not by the roadside bomb, as initially announced, but also that
crucial evidence had been withheld or destroyed.' 2 As a result of the in-
vestigation, four Marines were charged with unpremeditated murder, and
four officers were charged with dereliction for failing to report the inci-
dent to superiors, and for failing to initiate an investigation.'
29
The highest-ranking Marine to be indicted was a Lieutenant Colo-
nel.3 He was charged with incorrectly reporting the facts to his superior
and failing to open an investigation when it had appeared more than
likely that a violation of the laws of war had taken place."' According to
the investigating officer's report, which concluded that the Lieutenant
Colonel's case should go to trial, 32 the Lieutenant Colonel had approved
a report of the Haditha incident stating that fifteen civilians had died, all
as a result of the car bomb or the exchange of fire between coalition
forces and insurgents who were shooting from within the surrounding
houses. 13  The report, prepared and approved on the day of the killings,
stated further that the Lieutenant Colonel had gone to the scene to con-
duct a command assessment of the events. In fact, the Lieutenant
Colonel did not go to the scene until the day after the report was is-
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Paul von Zielbauer, 2 More Marine Trials in Killings of 17 Iraqis, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2008, at A8.
130. Indeed, he is the highest ranking U.S. military official to face a court-martial for
decisions or actions taken in combat since the war in Vietnam. Chelsea J. Carter, Courts-
Martial for 2 in Haditha Deaths, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 2007, available at http://
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-19-3785523458_x.htm. There are ten officer ranks
within the Marines, and Lieutenant Colonel is fifth-highest, ranking just below Colonel. See
U.S. Dep't of Defense, The United States Military Officer Rank Insignia,
http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/insignias/officers.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
131. Investigating Officer's Report, Executive Summ. of Pretrial Investigative Report in
the Case of Lieutenant Colonel XXX, pt. 5 (July 10, 2007) [hereinafter Investigating Officer's
Report]. This report was given to the author on the condition that the defendant's name not be
used. The author has retained a copy of the report on file.
132. Id. pt. 5, b; see 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2008) (mandating that an investigative report be
prepared prior to a trial by court-martial).
133. Investigating Officer's Report, supra note 131, pt. 3, m.
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sued,'" and after he had been ordered by his superior to conduct an in-
vestigation.' That investigation took the Lieutenant Colonel to the site
of the car bomb, where he spent roughly thirty minutes looking around;
he never stepped inside the homes where the killings had occurred.
13 6
Although the Lieutenant Colonel was subsequently approached by Iraqi
villagers who demanded that he open an investigation into the killings,
and although he assured them that he would, he did not investigate fur-
ther. 1
37
On the basis of the report approved by the Lieutenant Colonel de-
scribed above, the battalion developed a storyboard for the incident that
depicted the civilian casualties as the unfortunate consequence of the
insurgents' tactic of using civilians as human shields.'" That storyboard
was later invoked in response to the questions posed by Time maga-
zine. 39 Following Time's inquiry, the Lieutenant Colonel was again
asked by his superiors to conduct an investigation.1' The Lieutenant
Colonel responded indignantly, "'My men are not murderers .. . '" and
refused to investigate further.
14
Subsequent reports have stated that the first five Iraqis killed on that
day in Haditha were unarmed civilians, who were gunned down after
stepping out of their car and holding their arms in the air in a gesture of
surrender.142 Nineteen other civilians were killed, including women and
young children,143 in an operation in which the Staff Sergeant later or-
dered his troops to "'shoot first and ask questions later.'"'" On the other
hand, some of those present, as well as commentators on the case, argue
that the Marines acted in accordance with their rules of
134. Id. pt. 3, n; see also id. pt. 5, a.
135. Id. pt. 3, k.
136. Id. pt. 3, n.
137. Track Impunity Always, Report on Jeffrey Chessani, http://www.trial-ch.org/
en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/jeffreyschessani_724.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
138. Investigating Officer's Report, supra note 131, pt. 3, p.
139. Id.
140. Id. pt. 3, t.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Josh White, Death in Haditha: Eyewitness Accounts in Report Indicate
Marines Gunned Down Unarmed Iraqis in the Aftermath of a Roadside Bombing in 2005,
WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2007, at Al (reporting the findings of a Navy Criminal Investigative
Services report); Paul von Zielbauer, Marine Testifies to Urinating on Body, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2007, at A12.
143. See White, supra note 142.
144. Chelsea J. Carter, Court-Martial of Marine Postponed over CBS Subpoena, N.
COUNTY TIMES (San Diego), Feb. 29, 2008, available at http://nctimes.com/articles/2008/
03/01/military/9_14_062 29 08.txt.
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engagement,' 45 and that any over-zealousness in their response should be
attributed to nothing more nefarious than the "'fog of war.' ,,46
These diverging views may help to explain the military's lack of
success in convicting the four officers whom it sought to prosecute for
their failures to investigate. Charges against two of these officers have
been dropped-one in exchange for a grant of immunity for testimony
offered at the trials of the remaining defendants,'47 and the second be-
cause of insufficient evidence. 48 A third officer was charged with
participating in the cover-up by ordering the destruction of photographs
of the Iraqis killed in Haditha 49 He has since been acquitted, apparently
because the prosecution proved unable to establish that the destruction of
photos was anything other than prescribed military practice.'
50
The remaining officer-the Lieutenant Colonel who had refused to
investigate his men on the ground and maintained that they were "not
murderers"'-was to be tried before a court-martial for four counts of
dereliction of duty and one count of violating a lawful order to investi-
gate.'52 His case has since been dismissed without prejudice, after the
145. See, e.g., Thomas Watkins, Marine Officers Charged in Haditha Case, WASH.
POST, Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/22/
AR2006122200143.html.
146. Mark Walker, Haditha Trial Set to Unfold, N. COUNTY TIMES (San Diego), Feb. 23,
2008, at Al, A5, available at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2008/02/23/news/top-stories/
25_00_012 23 08.txt (quoting Gary Solis, described in the article as "a former Marine judge
and attorney who has written extensively on the laws of armed conflict"); see also Rick Rod-
gers, Haditha Charges Dropped for 2 Marines; General Issues Statement To Explain His
Decision, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 10, 2007, at A10 (reporting on a statement issued by
the military official who dismissed charges against two Marines involved in the Haditha inci-
dent, and quoting U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in explanation, as
saying that" 'detached reflection cannot be demanded in the face of an uplifted knife' ").
147. See, e.g., Rick Rodgers, Charges in Haditha Case Are Dropped; McConnell Led
Unit Accused in 24 Deaths, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 19, 2007, at B 1.
148. See id.
149. Additional Charge Sheet, United States v. 1st Lt. Andrew A. Grayson, U.S.
Marine Corps, Dec. 28, 2008, available at http://warchronicle.com/TheyAreNotKillers/
LtAndrewGrayson/Charges.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2008). Grayson faced up to six months
confinement for the dereliction of duty charge and five years for each of the two remaining
charges. See, e.g., Staff Reports, Intel Officer Faces Charges, LEATHERNECK, Dec. 22, 2006,
available at http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/showthread.php?t=38864.
150. Chelsea J. Carter, Marine Acquitted in Haditha Cover-Up Case, HUFFINGTON
POST, June 4, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/06/04/marine-acquitted-in-
hadit n_105336.html.
151. See supra text accompanying note 139.
152. See, e.g., Gidget Fuentes, Haditha CO Faces Additional Charges, MARINE CORPS
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, available at http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/08/
marinechessani-charges_070830/. Each of the dereliction of duty charges carries a maximum
penalty of six months confinement, and the violation of a lawful order charge carries a
maximum penalty of two years confinement. See, e.g., Staff Reports, 3rd Battalion Com-
mander Highest-Ranking Officer to Face Charges, LEATHERNECK, available at http://
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presiding judge found that the decision to charge him resulted from
"unlawful command influence" (essentially, an illegal conflict of inter-
est). 3 The prosecution has filed a notice of appeal."'54
The various readings of the Haditha incident-from a gun battle
with insurgents, to a My Lai type massacre, to an overblown, media-
driven witch-hunt-suggest a Rashomon-type complexity. As one com-
mentator cynically suggests: "Haditha became yet another test in a
polarized nation, and never mind the details: if you liked President
George W. Bush, you believed that no massacre had taken place; if you
disliked him, you believed the opposite."' 55 We may never arrive at a full,
coherent, and true account of Haditha, but the difficulty of making sense
of Haditha must lie, at least in part, with those who forsook their obliga-
tions to investigate and punish.
Further, whatever the real truth of Haditha, it remains instructive for
our purposes, for it illustrates the way in which the U.S. military under-
stands the harm inflicted by a failure to investigate and punish suspected
war crimes. At the time of the indictments, the military had good reason
to believe that a massacre had occurred. 56 Yet, the charges brought
www.leathemeck.com/forums/showthread.php?t=38864 [hereinafter 3rd Battalion Com-
mander to Face Charges].
153. Mark Walker, Charges Against Haditha Commander Dismissed, N. COUNTY TIMES
(San Diego), June 17, 2008, available at http://nctimes.com/articles/2008/06/17/military/
zeca5018258ba2e208825746b005ae619.txt [hereinafter Walker, Charges Dismissed]. Accord-
ing to the motion to dismiss, one of the lead investigators in the case subsequently served as
the legal advisor to the Lieutenant General who had ultimate authority in deciding whether to
bring charges against the Lieutenant Colonel. The motion alleged, and the presiding judge
found, that the legal advisor had taken part in dozens of meetings about the Haditha incident.
On the basis of this finding, the judge dismissed the case, although he left the door open for
the charges to be refiled under a new convening authority. Id.
It is not clear what to make of the dismissal. Those sympathetic to the prosecution insist
that the advisor did not offer and was not asked his opinion in the Haditha meetings. The
commander of the Marine forces in the Middle East, whose responsibility it was to decide
whether to prosecute, maintains that he "'make[s] his own decisions.'" See Walker, Charges
Dismissed, supra. On this account, then, it looks like the Marines believed that the evidence
was sufficiently strong to speak for itself in favor of prosecuting Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani.
Those who side with the defendant, on the other hand, are quick to point out that the whole
incident has had the stench of politics about it, and that the prosecuted Marines have been
scapegoated as a result of a too hasty outcry in the face of initial-and inadequate-news of
the Haditha killings. See, e.g., "Unlawful Command Influence" Taints Murtha Case, WORLD
NET DAILY, May 21, 2008, http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageld=64902.
For a fascinating study of command influence in military justice, see LUTHER C. WEST,
THEY CALL IT JUSTICE: COMMAND INFLUENCE AND THE COURT-MARTIAL SYSTEM (1977).
154. See, e.g., Mark Walker, Marine Corps Appealing Dismissal Ruling for Haditha, N.
COUNTY TIMES (San Diego), June 18, 2008, available at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/
2008/06/18/military/zcbf483709c591 cef8825746d00001c81 .txt.
155. William Langewiesche, Rules of Engagement, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2006, at 312,
318, available at http://www.vanityfair.compolitics/features/2006/1 I/haditha20061 1.
156. Investigating Officer's Report, supra note 131, pt. 4.
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against these commanders address only injuries that these officers alleg-
edly waged against the military itself-failing to fulfill a duty to the
military, obstructing the military's administration of justice, and bringing
discredit to the armed forces. These charges thus neglect the harm to the
families of the victims arising from a missed opportunity to have a full
account of the civilian killings brought to light-and to see justice done,
if in fact these killings did constitute war crimes. '
Haditha is enlightening for a second reason, for it invites inquiry into
the role of command influence in a commander's decision to investigate
or punish an offense of his troops. Strictly construed, command influ-
ence is "the improper use of command authority to steer or influence a
judicial process."'58 But, command influence is a broader force, for it can
arise well before a judicial process has been initiated. In particular,
command influence encompasses the power of commanders to help de-
termine which individuals and which offenses get disciplined in the first
place. Command influence was brought to the fore in the Haditha inci-
dent when it served as the ground for dismissing the case against the
Lieutenant Colonel. But, it likely reared its head well before then, and
may even have motivated the Lieutenant Colonel to forsake his obliga-
tion to investigate.
To grasp the interplay between command influence and the failure to
investigate or punish, we shall have to take a step back from Haditha,
and turn back in time to the My Lai massacre, through which the effects
of command influence are more easily discerned.
3. My Lai as a Window into the Forces Motivating U.S. Commanders
to Forego or Pursue Investigation and Punishment
One need not believe that Haditha involved a massacre, let alone one
of the scale or gravity of My Lai," 9 in order to be impressed by the simi-
157. In Part Ill, infra, I elaborate on the way in which the failure to investigate or punish
constitutes an expressive harm to the victims, or the families of the victims, of the underlying
offense.
158. Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military
Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 649, 664 (2002).
159. Even if Haditha did involve the known killing of unarmed civilians, it would still
pale in comparison to My Lai. For one thing, there is a significant difference between the
number killed in Haditha (twenty-four) and My Lai (approximately 500). See supra text ac-
companying note 121; Doug Anderson, "Kill Everyone in the Village", N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Mar. 22, 1992, at 11 (reviewing MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SIM, FOUR HOURS IN My LAI
(1992)). Further, accounts of Haditha suggest that the Marines ran quickly from house to
house, unsure of what they would find. Their "rampage" thus appears to have been spontane-
ous. The My Lai killings, by contrast, were found to have been premeditated, as the victims
were rounded up and then shot at point blank. See, e.g., Digital History, Summary of Peers
Report, http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/leaming-history/vietnam/peers-report.cfm (last
visited Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Peers Report]. Finally, at My Lai, many of the victims are
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larities between the military's handling of both incidents. My Lai was, of
course, the massacre named for the village in which it took place-a vil-
lage where, on March 16, 1968, approximately five hundred unarmed
and unresisting Vietnamese civilians, mostly women, children and old
men, were rounded up, shot, and killed.'6 The U.S. public did not learn
about the massacre until some six months later, in large part because of
the military's efforts to cover it up.
Like Haditha, My Lai followed on the heels of the deaths of U.S.
soldiers by a guerrilla enemy, which, at least in the case of My Lai,
"primed [these soldiers] for serious reprisals.'' Initial investigations at
My Lai, like those alleged to have been conducted just after the Haditha
killings' 62 were cursory and halfhearted.6 6 Also like Haditha, superiors
within the military received reports from the local population suggesting
that the incident was far worse than what had been stated in the reports
prepared by the military's investigators, yet the disparity prompted no
further investigation.'6 Perhaps most stunning of all, the North Vietnam-
ese's perception of the incident-like the Iraqis' of Haditha' 65-was
dismissed by the U.S. military as nothing more than enemy "propaganda
[intended] to discredit the United States."'"
Much has been written about My Lai in the years since the massacre,
so, even while the dust continues to swirl around Haditha, it is possible
to glean from My Lai the way in which a command culture, effectuated
in large part through command influence, incentivizes military cover-
167
ups.
believed to have been raped, tortured, and/or mutilated, but no such allegations have been
made about Haditha. See, e.g., Murder in the Name of War-My Lai, BBC NEWS, July 20,
1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/64344.stm.
160. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 153, at 154; Anderson, supra note 159.
161. Anderson, supra note 159.
162. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
163. Peers Report, supra note 159, pt. C, § 1, para. I ("Henderson's actions appear to
have been little more than a pretense of an investigation and had as their goal the suppression
of the true facts concerning the events of 16 March.").
164. Id. pt. C, §§ 1-2.
165. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
166. WEST, supra note 153, at 208 (quoting Colonel Henderson).
167. To be sure, the military has recognized and sought to curtail command influence,
which it has termed "the mortal enemy of justice." See, e.g., Walker, Charges Dismissed, su-
pra note 153. See generally Turley, supra note 158, at 666. Indeed, one of the goals behind the
drafting of the UCMJ was to curb command influence and thereby "increas[e] public confi-
dence in military justice." GENEROUS, supra note 11, at 27, 34. Yet, as Turley writes,
[T]he UCMJ had a less obvious but equally important effect: it established the fun-
damental principles for a distinct military justice system to adjudicate the full range
of criminal conduct in peacetime, including a distinct appellate system. On a more
functional level, while prohibiting unlawful command influence, the UCMJ also
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Scholars of command influence have noticed two insidious currents
in the administration of military justice. First, where an offense threatens
to embarrass the U.S. military, the prosecution will be vigorous, and the
pressure to convict fierce.'68 At the same time, every effort will be taken
to ensure that the embarrassment does not redound to those high up in
the chain of command.'69 The effect of these two currents is a kind of
scapegoating of low-level soldiers in an effort to ensure that the com-
mand remains "clean."'7 The My Lai incident provides a good
illustration of the way in which these currents operate.
Colonel Oran Henderson was the commander believed to have done
more than any other investigator in suppressing information about My
Lai. 7 ' Henderson had arrived in Vietnam and had assumed the position
continued to uphold the central role of the commanding officer as convening au-
thority with the consolidation of executive and judicial functions.
Turley, supra note 158, at 666. For an overview of the history of U.S. military law prior to the
drafting of the UCMJ, see, for example, AYcOCK & WURFEL, supra note 120, at 9-15.
168. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 153, at 101-02, 114; Kingsley R. Browne, Military Sex
Scandals from Thilhook to the Present: The Cure Can Be Worse Than the Disease, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 749, 762-64 (2007) (describing the way in which public and political
pressure to respond to the Tailhook allegations infected the administration of justice against
the accused).
Ironically, in situations in which the source of embarrassment is an offense committed
abroad, the court-martial system does little to include the foreign population in its trials. To be
sure, the Manual for Courts Martial (MCM) provides for open trials except in limited circum-
stances. MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 806(a) (2008) [hereinafter
MCM]. But, the MCM also contemplates, and permits, courts-martial to take place on a ship
at sea, or in a unit in a combat zone. See id. The exigencies of war may thus make it more
difficult for the victim or her family to witness the accused's trial. And, of course, many
courts-martial take place in the United States, as the Haditha trials did. By contrast, the Mos-
cow Declaration on German Atrocities, for example, signed by Great Britain, the United
States, and the Soviet Union on November 1, 1943, stated that those accused of war crimes
would, if possible, be "brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the
peoples whom they had outraged." Declaration on German Atrocities, U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R.,
Nov. 1, 1943, 9 Dep't. St. Bull. 310 (1943), 3 Bevans 816; Parks, supra note 50, at 15.
It is perhaps for this reason that Iraqis received news of the Haditha indictments with
great skepticism. Tim Reid, Marine Faces Murder Charges over Deaths of 24 Iraqi Civilians,
TIMESONLINE, Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us-and americas/
articlel264015.ece ("'The trial they are talking about is fake,' said Naji al-Ani, 36, a labourer
in Haditha. 'The troops should be brought here, in front of an Iraqi court. They committed a
horrible crime against innocents.' ").
169. WEST, supra note 153, at 134; cf Hillman, supra note II, at 2 ("Many soldiers
believe that officers are insulated against prosecution for wrongdoing by the political expedi-
ency of pushing blame to the lowest possible level, where it does not reflect as poorly on the
judgment of military and civilian leaders.").
170. WEST, supra note 153, at 134; see also Langewiesche, supra note 155 (reflecting on
the Haditha prosecutions: "The Corps has this reflex when it feels threatened at home. It has a
history of eating its young.").
171. See Peers Report, supra note 159 ("[Col.] Henderson's deception of his command-
ers as to what he had done to investigate the matter and as to the facts he had learned probably
played a larger role in the suppression of the facts of Son My than any other factor,").
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of Brigade Commander for the brigade that included the My Lai troops
just the day before the My Lai massacre. 172 Henderson was thus unsea-
soned when it came to the perils of Vietnam. But, this was his third war,
and he likely would have been no stranger to military culture.
Having been in a low-flying helicopter over My Lai on the morning
of the massacre, Henderson had a "box-office seat,' 73 and he is believed
to have witnessed the killing of between six and eight unresisting Viet-
namese civilians. He -also heard reports from two of his soldiers, who
believed that they had witnessed a massacre and described what they had
• 174
seen accordingly. Henderson thus had reason to know that a massacre
had occurred. But, if Henderson knew, so too did his superiors, Major
General Koster and Brigadier General George Young. Koster, like Hen-
derson, had witnessed the killing of unresisting civilians while flying in
a helicopter over My Lai on the day of the incident. 7 1 Young had twice
heard first-hand testimony that a massacre had occurred on that day.
176
On the afternoon following the My Lai incident, Henderson ordered
his troops to fly over the village of My Lai again. According to one sol-
dier who had received the order, the purpose of the return trip was to
determine the number of civilians who had been killed, and the cause of
their wounds. 77 But, Henderson's order was countermanded by Koster,
who personally rescinded the order by radio without explanation. 71 In
light of a culture in which commanders are supposed to insulate one an-
other from embarrassment and allegations of wrongdoing, '79 Henderson
may well have inferred from Koster's order that his superiors did not
want to know, or to have to acknowledge knowing, that there had been a
180
massacre.
Unfortunately for Henderson, his subordinates were not going to
give him an easy time of sweeping the incident under the rug. Several
172. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 153, at 196.
173. Id.
174. Major Frederick W. Watke, a pilot at My Lai, went to Brigadier General George
Young, Assistant Division Commander of the Americal Division, to officially report the mas-
sacre. WEST, supra note 153, at 207. A meeting was called for the next day, at which Watke,
Henderson, and Young were present, and at which Young directed Watke to repeat his story to
Henderson. Id. A second My Lai pilot, Hugh Thompson, who heroically rescued women and
children from My Lai in an effort to save them from his own peers, also shared his concerns
with Henderson on that day. Id. at 206.
175. Id. at 207.
176. Id. Interestingly, the Lieutenant Colonel in the Haditha incident has maintained that
his superiors had also been on notice of the possibility of war crimes, and that they too had
failed to order an investigation, although none of them has been prosecuted. See 3rd Battalion
Commander to Face Charges, supra note 152.
177. WEST, supra note 153, at 204.
178. Id.
179.. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
180. SeeWEST, supra note 153, at 201.
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made official reports of the massacre to Henderson or to Young. In the
wake of the report that Young received, he ordered Henderson to investi-
gate the massacre further and to report orally on his findings.
Perhaps still believing that his superiors wanted a whitewashed ver-
sion of the events,'8 ' Henderson conducted a slapdash and superficial
investigation into the incident and eventually authored a report that he
knew to contain misstatements." 2 That report stated that just twenty ci-
vilians had been killed, and that the killings had occurred inadvertently
in the course of a gun fight with the enemy.13 On the basis of this report,
Koster and Young could both maintain that they had no knowledge that a
massacre occurred-despite the fact that they, in fact, had good reason to
know of its occurrence.184
Had Henderson's report been allowed to stand, he would have suc-
ceeded in preventing blame for the massacre from traveling up the chain
of command. In the fall of 1968, however, several enlisted men con-
tacted their elected representatives and members of the President's
administration with information about My Lai, including photographic
evidence of the massacre.181
Once the U.S. public learned of the killings at My Lai, the first cur-
rent of command influence materialized: the military's attitude toward
the massacre shifted from one of suppression to one of rabid prosecu-
tion. Twelve enlisted men and sixteen officers were charged in
connection with My Lai. 86 Yet, Henderson was the only officer who was
tried in connection with the cover-up, and he was eventually acquitted. 
8 7
Henderson thus appears to have made a well-hedged-and ulti-
mately successful-bet. Had he conducted an assiduous investigation, he
would have inculpated his superiors and have risked ostracism or retalia-
tion."8 Worse still, given that he witnessed the killings as they were
181. See id.
182. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., The Heroes of My Lai: Ron Ridenhour's Story, http://www.law.umkc.edu/
faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/Myl-hero.html#RON (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
186. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Addicott & William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth Anniver-
sary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 39 MIL. L. REV. 153, 160-61 (1993).
187. WEST, supra note 153, at 196, 212.
188. One way in which superiors could pursue this retaliation would be to provide the
commander with a lukewarm efficiency report, since these reports form the basis of promo-
tional decisions. For instances in which military defense counsel have been retaliated against
in this way for zealously defending their clients, see id. at 72-73, 110-13; cf David J. Luban,
Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1999-2019 (2008) (de-
scribing the ways in which Judge Advocate General's Corps members assigned as defense
counsel before military commissions at Guantanamo face conflicts of interest, including
threats that zealous advocacy will lead to their own court-martial).
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occurring and did nothing to stop them, Henderson would have exposed
himself to the charge of failing to prevent the massacre.'89 A shoddy in-
vestigation, which turned up no illegal killings, could avoid these
difficulties. To be sure, by shirking his duty to investigate, Henderson
risked subjecting himself to a charge of dereliction of duty. But that
charge carries a relatively moderate penalty-a maximum of six-months
confinement per offense.' 9° By contrast, the failure to prevent is, under
the UCMJ,'9' grounds for treatment as a principal in the underlying of-
fense-murder, in this case, which is punishable by death.' 92 Besides,
Henderson could wager that his loyalty to the officer class would be re-
warded at any eventual trial-as indeed it may have been, since the jury
that acquitted him consisted of five colonels and two generals.'93
Henderson's maneuverings in the My Lai incident suggest that there
are institutional dynamics-in particular, a norm of mutual protection
among officers and a military justice system that sometimes affords
enough wiggle room to facilitate that protection'9 -that already incline
commanders to forsake their duties to investigate and punish. Some of
In other instances, the retaliation is more blatant, as when Brigadier General Janis Kar-
pinski, commanding officer at Abu Ghraib, was demoted to Colonel after the detainee abuse
scandal broke-on some accounts, because she failed to "allow or encourage such illegal
practices." Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 409-10 & n. 76.
189. Cf Darley, supra note 112, at 34 (arguing that organizations confront an incentive
not to punish executives who commit harm and then engage in a cover-up, since punishing
these executives is an admission that the organization itself committed harm). Although Hen-
derson sought to avoid blame for My Lai, he nonetheless saw himself as blameworthy. After
his acquittal, he reported that he felt "responsible for the incident because the troops involved
were under his command" Michael T. Kaufman, Oran Henderson, 77, Dies; Acquitted in My
Lai Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1998, at D21.
190. See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2008).
191. See 10 U.S.C. § 877 (2008) (considering a principal to be, inter alia, one who aids
and abets the commission of a crime).
192. See 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2008). For an example of one who was charged with murder
for his failure to prevent, consider the case of Captain Ernest Medina, who was tried by court-
martial on the theory that "'[he] knew his orders were being misconstrued and that his troops
were murdering noncombatants [at My Lai].'" WEST, supra note 153, at 182 (quoting from the
opening statement of military prosecutor Major William G. Eckhardt at Medina's court-
martial). The prosecution in that case did not seek to argue that Medina ordered the massacre;
instead, it claimed that his decision not to intervene, given what he knew, "'offered comfort
and encouragement to his men in carrying out the carnage.'" Id. at 182-84. For this assis-
tance, Medina was initially charged with the murder of 102 villagers, although the prosecution
did not seek the death penalty in his case. Id. at 184. The charges were eventually reduced to
involuntary manslaughter, and would have been punishable by a maximum of three years of
confinement. Id. at 192. In the end, however, Medina, like Henderson, was acquitted. Id. at
193.
193. WEST, supra note 153, at 212.
194. For accounts of the ways in which the military justice system can be subject to the
insidious influence of military commanders, see generally WEST, supra note 153; Lindsey
Nicole Alleman, Who Is in Charge, and Who Should Be? The Disciplinary Role of the Com-
mander in Military Justice Systems, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169 (2006).
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these may have been at work in the Haditha incident. Or, more charita-
bly, Haditha may represent a case in which the commander decided to
balk at the norms of command culture. The Lieutenant Colonel in
Haditha might honestly have believed that no illegal killings had oc-
curred. His initial failure to investigate adequately, and subsequent
refusal to investigate, might thus have been a showing of solidarity with
his troops, whom he was not about to sacrifice for the sake of superiors
so whipped up by public outcry as to already presume his troops' guilt.
Whatever a commander's motivations for failing to investigate or to
punish-whether to protect his superiors or his subordinates-the fact
remains that his response to these institutional dynamics is enabled
where the failure to investigate and punish is treated solely as a derelic-
tion of duty. There are, then, considerations of deterrence that counsel in
favor of ratcheting up the offense of failing to punish. In particular, if the
failure to punish were treated as a graver offense than dereliction of duty,
then the potential penalties for failing to punish might be sufficiently
weighty to offset the incentives otherwise motivating a commander's
willful ignorance. In this way, a robust failure to punish prong could de-
ter military cover-ups.
Yet, deterrence is not the only, or even the key, factor supporting en-
hanced punishments for the failure to punish. Commanders who fail to
investigate or to punish an atrocity of their troops sometimes deserve
more punishment than they receive-or so the next Part seeks to estab-
lish.
II. FAILURE TO PUNISH AS AN EXPRESSIVE HARM
As established in Part I, both international and domestic law cur-
rently treat a commander's failure to punish his troops solely as a matter
of dereliction of duty despite doctrinal and historical support for a mode
of liability approach. In so doing, the law construes the commander's
crime as an offense against the State-or quasi-state authority-that
vested him with the obligation to punish. In this Part, I argue that com-
manders who endorse or acquiesce in their troops' atrocity by failing to
punish it do more than just shun their obligations to the State; they also
compound the offense to the victims of the atrocity, and this contribution
to the atrocity ought to serve as a ground for criminal liability for the
underlying offense.
Part II.A draws out the normative dimensions of the military com-
mand structure in an effort to establish that, under certain circumstances,
the mere failure to punish a war crime committed by a commander's
subordinates justifies attribution of that war crime to the commander.
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Part II.B advances an expressivist conception of harm in order to identify
the circumstances in which the failure to punish supplies this justifica-
tion. In Part II.C, I argue that the account advanced in the first two
sections of this Part can withstand scholarly objections to the mode of
liability view.
A. The Normative Implications of the Military Command Structure
In this Section, I argue that a soldier's war crime is ascribable to his
commander if his commander declines to punish the crime because he
either endorses it or fears that punishment will thwart his own ambitions.
To begin, consider that soldiers' routine operations are typically as-
cribable to their commander. The ascription flows from a central feature
of the structure of military relationships-viz., the near-total autonomy
soldiers relinquish during basic training and while on duty. 95 Active sol-
diers do not plan their day, let alone actively pursue projects of greater
duration. Instead, what it is to be a soldier is to subject one's will to the
will of one's superior; it is to allow another--one's commander-to
execute his agency through you.' 96 To be sure, the relinquishment is not
total. Soldiers are not mere automatons, void of consciousness of their
actions. Although the threat of coercion-and, in particular, discipline
for disobedience-may deter soldiers from reclaiming their autonomy,
195. See, e.g., MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE &
THE LAW OF WAR 241 n.21 (1999) [hereinafter OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS]; Osiel, Banality of
Good, supra note 8, at 1770 (arguing that the doctrine of superior responsibility "stresses the
formal, hierarchical structure of military organizations and the consequent reasons why a
high-ranking superior can reasonably expect his orders to be obeyed, including standing or-
ders to honor the Geneva Conventions"); Gary D. Solis, Obedience of Orders and the Law of
War: Judicial Application in American Forums, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 481, 526 (1999)
("[S]ubordinates will obey illegal orders, given the overwhelming influence of the military
hierarchical structure-particularly in the lower ranks and in combat.").
196. Cf Osiel, Banality of Good, supra note 8, at 1831-32 (describing Claus Roxin's
theory of the bureaucratization of mass atrocity). Osiel states,
The superior's control over an "organizational apparatus of hierarchical power,' as
Roxin calls it, enables him to utilize the subordinate "as a mere gear in a giant ma-
chine" to produce the criminal result "automatically." . . . Roxin's key insight, then,
is that the more powerful party behind the scenes may, through the organizational
resources at his disposal (including the culpable inferior) be said to commit the of-
fense.
Id. (quoting Claus Roxin, Problemas de autora y participaci6n en la criminalidad organizada
[Problems of perpetration and participation in organized crime], in DELINCUENCIA ORGANI-
ZADA: ASPECTOS PENALES, PROCESALES Y CRIMINOL6GICOS [ORGANIZED CRIME: CRIMINAL,
PROCEDURAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL ASPECTS] 191, 194 (Juan Carlos Ferr6 Oliv6 & Enrique
Anarte Borrallo eds., 1999) (footnotes omitted); Smidt, supra note 13, at 158 ("Soldiers learn
to rely on the commander's guidance as the soldier surrenders some of his own discretion,
judgment, and inhibitions to play a role in the collective success of the unit and to further the
higher cause in which they are engaged.").
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the possibility of disobedience is always a live one. 9' It is for this reason
that the defense of superior orders has traditionally been found unavail-
ing.' 9' Nonetheless, the military ideal, and the routine reality, is one in
which soldiers serve-they do what their commanders order them to do.
If we are entitled to ascribe to the commander a soldier's routine
military operation, are we also entitled to ascribe to him a war crime
committed by one of his soldiers without his prior authorization?'" In
other words, does the logic of commander authorship, grounded as it is
in the command structure, extend to the extraordinary case in which sol-
diers commit atrocities while on active duty? One might think that it
does not; in particular, one might hold that the illegal nature of the sol-
diers' act blocks, at least presumptively, the ascription of that act to the
commander. The commander is owed the benefit of the doubt, on this
thought, in virtue of the duties and prestige attaching to his office. He is
charged with instructing his subordinates about the laws of war, and in-
culcating a norm of adherence to those laws.' °° Further, his status
demands deference and, in this circumstance, deference requires that the
commander enjoy a presumption that he will have discharged the duties
of his office. In general, then, we suspend the ascription of the soldier's
act to his commander where the act constitutes a violation of the laws of
war.
Sometimes, however, the suspension is not warranted, and we return
to the situation in which it is appropriate to ascribe soldiers' acts to their
commander. In the clearest case, the commander who ordered an atrocity
forfeits the benefit of the doubt. In that case, the atrocity can no longer
be considered a rogue act; instead, the operation of the command struc-
197. For example, in the case of the bridge-throwing incident, discussed above, see su-
pra text accompanying notes 28-34. One of the five soldiers involved refused to follow his
platoon commander's order to take the captured Iraqis down to the riverbank, despite the pos-
sibility of arrest that his refusal risked. See Dexter Filkins, The Fall of the Warrior King, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 23, 2005, at 52, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/23/
magazine/23sassaman.html.
198. See John D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of
Mens Rea in International Criminal Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 57, 76-84
(2004); see also Solis, supra note 195, at 484-87 (reviewing the history of the superior orders
defense).
199. I use the terms "violations of the laws of war," "atrocities," and "war crimes" inter-
changeably, and I distinguish these crimes from crimes that soldiers commit that cannot
plausibly be related to their military positions. Thus, for example, although an off-duty soldier
may be court-martialed for a "midnight punch to the gut outside of a downtown bar," Ohman,
supra note 26, at 62, there is no suggestion that his superior will bear responsibility for the
soldier's assault.
200. See, e.g., OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS, supra note 195, at 260.
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ture is restored and the soldier's act is properly attributed to his com-
mander.2°'
Yet, ordering an offense is not the only contribution that deprives the
commander of the benefit of the doubt; failing to punish does so as well,
but it does not operate as decisively as does ordering an atrocity. The
commander who orders an offense both forfeits the benefit of the doubt
and confirms the ascription of his soldiers' act to him in one fell swoop,
as it were. The commander who fails to punish an atrocity of his troops
also foregoes the benefit of the doubt, but more is needed to confirm that
his soldiers' atrocity is ascribable to him. In particular, it must be the
case that his failure to punish can be read as an expression of his sup-
port for his troops'act.22
In the next Section, I elaborate on the reasons for which expressing
support through punishment constitutes a means of participation in the
underlying offense. In the remainder of this Section, I identify the cir-
cumstances in which the failure to punish conveys support for an
offense.
To begin, it is worth noting that a commander may forego punish-
ment for any number of reasons, not all of which convey his support. For
example, a military emergency may entail that a commander's attention
is necessarily elsewhere."3 In such a case, withholding punishment may
well be the right thing to do, at least while the military emergency exists.
But, there are other, less clear-cut, cases. For instance, consider
the commander who foregoes punishment out of solidarity with his
troops, if not with their offense. Lt. Col. Sassaman, the commander of
the soldiers who threw Iraqi civilians off of a bridge, offered this expla-
nation for instructing his soldiers to cover up their act.' °" Considerations
201. For a commander to order the act is for him to cause it to be done. Given that causa-
tion is paradigmatically taken to be a necessary condition for criminal liability, see, e.g.,
Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, I CRIM. L. & PHIL. 289, 290 (2007) [hereinafter
Kutz, Causeless Complicity], international and domestic law have no trouble in holding com-
manders who order an atrocity criminally liable for that atrocity, see, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra
note 21, art. 7(1); 32 C.F.R. § 11.6(c)(3).
202. Compare Parks, supra note 50, at 81. Parks states,
Current British military law ... consider[s] a commander to have acquiesced in an
offense "if he fails to use the means at his disposal to insure compliance with the
law of war"; in comment it continues: "The failure to do so raises the presump-
tion-which for the sake of the effectiveness of the law cannot be regarded as easily
rebuttable--of authorisation, encouragement, connivance, acquiescence or subse-
quent ratification of the criminal acts."
Id. (quoting III BRITISH WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW: LAW OF WAR ON LAND,
para. 631 & n.l (1958).
203. Oric attempted to raise a watered-down version of this explanation in his defense.
which the ICTY refused to entertain. OriK Trial Judgment, supra note 42, 559.
204. See Filkins, supra note 31.
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of political expediency may also lead a commander to pass over his
troops' crime; where, for example, support for the military effort is wan-
ing, a commander may seek to avoid the negative publicity that
investigation into an atrocity will undoubtedly invite. Then again, a
commander may be motivated to forego punishment not for the sake of
some larger national goal, but instead for the sake of personal ambition
and, in particular, a fear that his subordinates' offense will taint his fu-
ture professional prospects." 5 Finally, a commander's failure to punish
may arise not from considerations exogenous to his subordinates' crime
but instead from the crime itself, for the commander may approve of his
troops' act and hence view it as unworthy of punishment.
In what follows, I focus on these last two reasons for failing to pun-
ish-viz., cases in which the failure stems from self-interested concerns
or from approval of the underlying offense. In the former case, the com-
mander acquiesces in his troops' crime; in the latter case, he endorses it.
It may well be that dereliction of duty is an inadequate response not
only in cases of endorsement or acquiescence, but also in cases in which
a commander fails to punish out of solidarity with his troops, or because
• • 206
he is concerned about the broader political ramifications of punishing.
Nonetheless, I defend the mode of liability view here only as it applies to
cases of endorsement or acquiescence, which are, I take it, among the
most culpable reasons for failing to punish.2 7 The mode of liability view
is controversial enough, as we shall see 20 and so should be defended, in
the first instance, with the strongest cases for a robust doctrine of com-
mand responsibility in hand.
The claim to be defended in the next Section, then, is that, in cases
of acquiescence or endorsement, we are entitled to conclude that the
commander bears responsibility for his subordinates' offense.
First, though, a few more words about endorsement and acquies-
cence. The commander who endorses his subordinates' atrocity does not
view that atrocity as worthy of punishment; he shares his subordinates'
belief that the victims warrant the treatment that they have received. The
commander who acquiesces in his subordinates' atrocity privileges his
own interests over his duty to punish; he expresses indifference to the
victims of the atrocity.
205. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
206. I assume that military necessity may furnish a justification for a commander's fail-
ure to punish, in which case his failure ought not to be punished at all.
207. But cf Darley, supra note 112, at 31 (arguing that covering up an injury out of soli-
darity for one's fellows will subsequently render the dissimulator culpable where maintaining
the lie entails that the injurious conduct will continue).
208. See infra Part H.C.
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Some have depicted the Haditha incident in terms that make it sound
like an instance of endorsement. According to one recent investigative
report, for example, "the commanders [in Haditha] had created a climate
that minimized the importance of Iraqi lives.,,209 Even more compelling is
the case of Maj. Gen. Shigeru Sawada, who was prosecuted before a
U.S. Military Commission in Shanghai for permitting the illegal trial and
execution of three U.S. airmen during World War 11.210 The trial underly-
ing Sawada's indictment occurred in his absence. When he was later
informed of the trial and its results, Sawada endorsed the record and
forwarded it to the chain of command.21' The three airmen had been sen-
tenced to death and, once Sawada endorsed the verdict, the death
sentences were carried out. The Military Commission held that Sawada
had "ratified the illegal acts which occurred in his absence and therefore
bore the responsibility for them."212 In other words, although Sawada did
not conduct or otherwise guide the trial that the Military Commission
subsequently deemed illegal, the trial and its results were nonetheless
ascribed to him because he had retroactively authorized them.
For an example of acquiescence, consider a 1996 Canadian scandal
in which then-Minister of Defense Kim Campbell, vying for the post of
Prime Minister in an upcoming election, participated in suppressing in-
formation about the murder of a sixteen-year-old Somali boy committed
by Canadian peace-keeping troops in Somalia.23 Here, Campbell may
well have privately disapproved of the peacekeepers' act. She nonethe-
less determined that punishing the atrocity would bring it to light, and
that the public's response to the atrocity would target her, and thereby
damage her political ambitions.2 4
209. David S. Cloud, Marines May Have Excised Evidence on 24 Iraqi Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at A6 (citing a report based on an investigation by Maj. Gen. Eldon A.
Bargewell of the U.S. Army); see also Rodgers, supra note 146 (quoting a contemporary
scholar's invocation of the "'mere gook rule'" to analogize the alleged devaluation of the Viet
Cong by U.S. troops fighting in Vietnam to the Haditha Marines' attitudes toward Iraqis).
210. See Trial of Lieutenant-General Shigeru Sawada and Three Others, Case No. 25, 5
U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N L. REP. TRIALS & WAR CRIMINALS I (U.S. Mil. Comm'n in
Shanghai 1948).
211. Parks, supra note 50, at 74.
212. Id.; see also Gary D. Solis, Judge-Advocates, Courts-Martial, and Military Law
Advisors, 191 MIL. L. REv. 153, 160-61 (2007).
213. See, e.g., Allan Thompson, Canada's New Face at U.N. an Enigma, TORONTO STAR,
Jan. 15, 1995, at A7 ("The Ottawa-based military magazine Esprit de Corps has bluntly and
audaciously accused Fowler of engineering a cover-up, partly to protect the political fortunes
of Kim Campbell, who was then defence minister and a contender for the Tory leadership.").
214. For a strikingly similar fictional version of this scenario, consider the plot line from
the series finale of The Wire, in which a Baltimore mayor with his sights set on the governor-
ship declines to punish a major police scandal because news of the scandal would hurt his
gubernatorial campaign. The Wire: -30- (HBO television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008).
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It is worth noting that, considered in and of themselves, of the two,
endorsement is worse than acquiescence. The moral difference between
endorsement and acquiescence can perhaps be grasped by analogizing
the pair to the distinction between dolus eventualis and recklessness.
Both dolus eventualis and recklessness entail that one knowingly under-
takes a risk, but the former has the added dimension that one willingly
does so.25 As one set of commentators puts it, with dolus eventualis,
there is the element of "approval and identification with the evil re-
sult.'21 6 Similarly, the commander who endorses an atrocity of his troops
does not merely know that forgoing punishment will deprive the atroc-
ity's victims of the restoration that punishment can confer;"' he intends
this deprivation, for it is the mechanism through which he aligns himself
with his subordinates' atrocity. By contrast, with acquiescence, the
commander knows that forgoing punishment will fail to restore the
atrocity's victims but, all else being equal, he might prefer that the resto-
ration occur. For example, Kim Campbell might well have punished the
perpetrators of the Somali boy's death had doing so not conflicted with
ambitions. Yet, while the injury of acquiescence is lessher political iis.  iet ijr aqisec ls
categorical than that arising from endorsement, acquiescing is worse
than the blanket offense of dereliction of duty, for one can be derelict in
his duty to punish even if he has good reasons to forego punishment.
I have contended that a commander's failure to punish is not justifi-
able in cases in which the failure signals acquiescence or endorsement.
But, I have not yet argued that these reasons for foregoing punishment
are reprehensible enough to warrant holding a commander responsible
for his subordinates' offense. To establish that claim, I first must inquire
into the expressive dimensions of the failure to punish.
B. The Expressive Harm of Failing to Punish
The expressive characteristics of punishment can explain why com-
manders who endorse or acquiesce in their subordinates' atrocity ought
to be held criminally liable for that atrocity. General theories of expres-
sivism are concerned with the way that action, speech, or any other mode
215. See, e.g., Meloni, supra note 25, at 635 n.94.
216. George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of
Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 539, 554 (2005); see also Martinez,
supra note 7, at 644-45.
217. See infra Part fl.B.
218. Compare Article 4 of the French Ordinance of 28 August 1944, which subjected
commanders to prosecution if they "'tolerated the criminal acts of their subordinates.'" Smidt,
supra note 13, at 176 n.84 (quoting 4 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REP. OF TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 87 (1948)). As Smidt notes, toleration "may exist even where one is person-
ally opposed to the conduct but takes no affirmative action to prevent the behavior," id. at 176,
or, perhaps, to punish it either.
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of expression manifests a belief, attitude, emotion, and so on.21 9 Expres-
sivism holds that "we are morally required to express the right attitudes
toward people., 220 Although general expressivist theories do not specify
what count as the "right attitudes, 22' those who have articulated expres-
sivist theories of punishment are largely inspired by Kantian ethics,
according to which actions should express persons' equal moral worth 2
Thus, on such a theory, the injury of a crime consists not just of its
physical or psychological harm but also of the affront to the victim's
self-worth. As Jeffrie Murphy writes, "such injuries are also messages-
symbolic communications. They are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to
us, 'I count but you do not' ... .,,223 Further, empirical research supports
the expressivist's sense that a significant part of the harm of a crime lies
in its emotional or psychic consequences for the victim.
224
A commander's efforts to punish his troops' unauthorized atrocity
can remedy the expressive injury that the atrocity waged. For the
219. See e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1508 (2000). For one application of expressiv-
ist theories to international war crimes, see Diane Marie Amann, Message As Medium in
Sierra Leone, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237, 238 (2001).
220. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 219, at 1514.
221. See, e.g., id. at 1509.
222. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY 35, 46 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1998) [hereinafter Hampton, For-
giveness, Resentment and Hatred].
223. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY,
supra note 222, at 14, 25; see also Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, supra note
222, at 44 ("When someone wrongs another, she does not regard her victim as the sort of
person who is valuable enough to require better treatment."). At some points, Hampton claims
that the victim will experience the perpetrator's message as an affront only if she subscribes to
a non-egalitarian theory of human worth. See, e.g., Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and
Hatred, supra note 222, at 53. In other words, the victim must already believe that it is possi-
ble for one person's value to differ from another's if the victim is to feel hurt by the expressive
content of the perpetrator's injury. Since Hampton adopts an egalitarian theory of human
worth, the effect of her claim is to impugn the notion that injuries do indeed involve expres-
sive harms. See, e.g., id.; Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY,
supra note 222, at 111, 111-61 [hereinafter Hampton, The Retributive Idea]. But, Hampton's
claim is problematic for several reasons. First, as Jeffrie Murphy points out, one's worth is an
ineluctable social fact: "Our self-respect is social .... and it is simply part of the human con-
dition that we are weak and vulnerable in these ways." Murphy, supra, at 25. Second, the
victim may subscribe to an egalitarian theory of human worth but recognize that others do not,
and she may resent being called on to defend her worth, in the face of the perpetrator's smear,
to these others. Finally, Hampton enjoys a rhetorical advantage in the argument, for a non-
egalitarian theory of human worth raises the specter of racism or ethnic-based animus. But the
rhetorical advantage is spurious, for one may hold that individuals are unequal in worth not by
virtue of some ascriptive characteristic, but by virtue of their characters. Where one's theory
of worth is character-based in this way, it is not clear that it is any less attractive than the egali-
tarian view that Hampton adopts. As such, the injuries that a character-based theory of human
worth makes salient deserve our attention.
224. See, e.g., Kenworthy Bilz & John M. Darley, What's Wrong with Harmless Theories
of Punishment?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV 1215, 1233-35 (2004).
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expressivist, punishment serves the role of restoring the victim to a posi-
tion of equal worth in his eyes and in the eyes of others; it vindicates his
status as a moral equal. Punishment can thus "annul the message, sent by
the crime, that [perpetrator and victim] are not equal in value. 225
Where a commander fails to punish an atrocity because he endorses
that atrocity, or because his own interests have gotten in the way, he de-
nies the victims of the atrocity the opportunity for the restoration of
dignity. Instead, he effectively underwrites the dignitary harm that the
atrocity waged.226 Indeed, because of his position of superior authority,
he lends even more credence to the estimation of the worth of the vic-
tims expressed by the soldiers' act. His stature has already been ratified
by the society that placed him in a distinguished military position, and so
the expression of the victims' inferior worth communicated by his failure
to punish carries that much more credibility.
227
The commander is uniquely situated to affirm or deny the meaning
of the soldiers' act through punishment. When a commander declines to
punish his soldiers because he endorses or acquiesces in their offense, he
affirms the meaning that the offense conveyed. And, his position within
the military command structure lends this affirmation a credibility and
gravity that it lacked in its guise as a rogue act. The dignitary harm
waged by the commander's failure to punish thus comes to constitute
part of the wrong of the atrocity. In this way, we should view the atrocity
as one that is extended through time, with an initial set of harms inflicted
by the soldiers, and an additional dignitary assault waged by the com-
mander.228 It is because the commander compounds his subordinates'
225. Hampton, The Retributive Idea, supra note 223, at 131. I do not mean to suggest
that all punishment will affect the called-for restoration of dignity. It will not be sufficient for
the commander to punish his troops solely for their disobedience. That punishment responds
to the manner in which the soldiers carried out the atrocity, not the nature of the atrocity itself.
Thus, we could imagine a commander retroactively authorizing some benign act that his sol-
diers had performed of their own accord, while also punishing them for having acted without
orders. Nor will it be sufficient for the commander to punish his troops for the atrocity itself if
he does so only as a matter of towing the line. For example, if the commander imposes a harsh
punishment even while he publicly endorses his subordinates' atrocity, his endorsement will
undercut the expressive force of the punishment. Only if the punishment addresses the atrocity
itself, and conveys the commander's public condemnation of his soldiers' act, will it serve to
counter the expressive component already present in the atrocity.
226. Cf Kutz, Causeless Complicity, supra note 201, at 303 (arguing that the attorneys
in the Bush Administration who authored the so-called "torture memos" bear responsibility for
the Administration's unlawful interrogation techniques, even if these techniques occurred
prior to the memos 'production, because the memos ratified these earlier acts).
227. Cf Murphy, supra note 223, at 25 (describing the symbolic message communicated
by an offense's perpetrator as signaling that "'I am here up high and you are there down be-
low' ").
228. This understanding of the commander's contribution accurately tracks, I believe,
the scenario in which soldiers commit an unauthorized atrocity in which their commander
subsequently comes to participate as a result of a failure to punish that is rooted in the com-
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offense in this way that he ought to be held criminally liable for it. 229As
Immanuel Kant noted, if those charged with punishing "fail to do so,
they may be regarded as accomplices," and the "bloodguilt" of the perpe-
trator's crime will come to rest with them.230
Dereliction of duty does not track the commander's contribution to
the wrong. The commander who is derelict in his duty to punish offends
against the State that bestowed on him the obligation to punish. But,
commanders who endorse or acquiesce in their troops' atrocity do more
than just neglect their obligations to the State; they add to the injury of
the atrocity."'
mander's endorsement or acquiescence. I do not contend here, however, that this understand-
ing is the best way in which to construe the contribution of a commander involved in a
campaign whose very purpose is to wage atrocities on the victim group. Thus, for example,
William Schabas is correct to argue that the wrong perpetrated by military superiors in
Rwanda is something far worse than failing to punish genocide, for these superiors operated
with the intention that their subordinates commit genocide. See Osiel, Banality of Good, supra
note 8, at 1788 (quoting e-mail from William Schabas, Dir., Irish Ctr. for Hum. Rts., Nat'l
Univ. of Ir., to Mark Osiel (July 20, 2005, 10:24:19 EST)). By contrast, many of the most
egregious abuses committed in the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, see supra text
accompanying notes 30-36, as well as those emerging from the Balkan conflict, see, e.g.,
supra text accompanying notes 41-51, begin as the rogue acts of a handful of soldiers that
come to redound to their superiors only after the fact, and only because those superiors will-
fully turned a blind eye to cover them up.
229. It will be useful to distinguish the argument that I advance from a strategy proposed
by Osiel in his efforts to find a legally cognizable way of holding members of an officer corps
responsible for atrocities committed by their subordinates. Osiel summarizes his proposal as
follows: "When a high-level officer is convicted of mass atrocity, fellow officers of the same
or higher rank within his relevant unit would collectively suffer monetary sanctions*" Osiel,
Banality of Good, supra note 8, at 1842-43. Osiel describes the fellow officers as "well-
positioned bystanders"-that is, individuals who could perhaps have averted the atrocity had
they interceded. Id. at 1844. The rationale for his approach lies in its deterrent effect; he con-
cedes that the approach does not hew to liberalism's insistence upon individual guilt. See id. at
1845-46. The approach that I advance, by contrast, does not view commanders who omit to
intercede as mere bystanders; instead, because they have a duty to intercede, their omission
constitutes a ground of culpability. Thus officers are held responsible not in spite of concerns
about individual guilt but precisely because they bear such guilt.
230. Hampton, The Retributive Idea, supra note 223, at 131 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT,
THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 102 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1965)
(1797)).
231. In what sense, one may wonder, does a commander add to the atrocity of his troops
if he falls to investigate a suspected atrocity, yet it subsequently emerges that no underlying
offense was in fact committed? For example, on some accounts of the Haditha incident, the
Marines are believed to have acted within the scope of their rules of engagement. See, e.g.,
Walker, supra note 146. If these accounts are correct, what does the commanding officer's
failure to conduct an investigation into the civilian casualties entail for his guilt on the expres-
sivist theory advanced here?
Again, we are concerned only with cases in which the commander neglects to investigate
because he believes that the alleged victims deserve to be treated as they claim to have been
treated (i.e., he would endorse his subordinates' atrocity, if they had committed one), or he
believes that investigating the alleged atrocity is contrary to his personal interests (i.e., he
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For similar reasons, a finding of "conduct unbecoming, 232 or a "de-
motion in rank, 2 3 1 fails adequately to respond to the nature of the
commander's injury. The commander's participation in the atrocity of
his troops, which results from the expressive harm that his failure to pun-
ish lends to his soldiers' act, already reveals him to be unworthy of the
prestige and authority that attaches to a command position. Demoting
the commander, or sanctioning him for conduct unbecoming, is just a
formal acknowledgment that he occupied a position superior to that
which he deserved; these penalties do not address the expressive harm
itself.
34
Finally, I am doubtful that the doctrine of complicity would extend
to the harm of acquiescence or endorsement that I articulate here. Under
international law, for example, the accomplice "must have contributed in
a material way to the crime. 235 Since the commander's failure to punish
arises after his subordinates have completed their acts, his failure cannot
be said to have made a material contribution. Further, it is far from clear
that the failure to punish would fit within even the more capacious un-
acquiesces in the alleged atrocity). In such cases, the commander's failure to investigate in-
flicts an expressive harm, but there is no underlying offense to compound with that harm.
I believe that the appropriate analog for these cases is the doctrine of attempt. Where one
attempts, but fails, to harm another, it is fair to say that the intended victim nonetheless suffers
an expressive injury, for one's intention to harm her already communicates that one believes
that she deserves no better. Moreover, the person who made the attempt is prosecuted for more
than just this expressive injury; because it is merely a matter of moral luck that his efforts
were thwarted, the law does not greatly discount his punishment, relative to that of the suc-
cessful offender.
The commander who fails to investigate out of endorsement or acquiescence, then, is like
the person who attempts a crime. He seeks to align himself with the atrocity. The fact that no
atrocity occurred should exculpate him no more than the fact that no crime eventuated should
exculpate the person who attempted the offense.
232. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2008) ("Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midship-
man who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as
a court-martial may direct."); Hillman, supra note 11, at 5 n.18 (suggesting that the officers
implicated in torture at Abu Ghraib could, at least in theory, have been prosecuted under the
"conduct unbecoming" provision of the UCMJ).
233. Such was the penalty imposed on Sergeant Selena Salcedo, who was implicated in
the abuse of a detainee at Bagram Air Force Base that eventually led to his death. Salcedo pled
guilty and received a sentence of a one-grade reduction in rank, along with a $1,000 fine and a
written reprimand. Ohman, supra note 26, at I11.
234. To wit: suppose the military brass were contemplating whether to promote a soldier
to a command position when they learned that, before joining the military, the soldier had
committed an expressive injury similar in magnitude to the commander's. The brass might, on
the basis of that information, deny the soldier the promotion. But, their doing so would not be
a form of punishment; it would be a reflection of their assessment that he was unfit for a
command position. Cf Murphy, supra note 223, at 27 ("The suffering occasioned by falling
from a position that (as one's wrongful actions demonstrate) one had no right to occupy in the
first place hardly seems relevant from the moral point of view.").
235. William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Law: Catching the Accomplices, 83
INT'L REv. RED CRoss 439, 446 (2001).
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derstanding of complicity in domestic law. Domestic accomplice law
does extend to cases in which the defendant attempted but failed to assist
or encourage the principal-that is, to cases in which the defendant's
contribution did not make an actual difference, although it could have
done So.236 But, the commander's failure to punish would not satisfy even
a counterfactual standard of culpability, for the failure to punish neces-
sarily arises after the subordinates have committed their atrocity, and a
later event can never cause an earlier one. As such, a commander's fail-
ure to punish his troop's atrocity could never make a difference to that
237
atrocity's occurrence.
Although endorsement and acquiescence likely do not fit within the
doctrine of complicity, they nonetheless share something of the spirit of
that doctrine. In particular, to the extent that endorsement-and, to a
lesser extent, acquiescence-constitutes a kind of encouragement, the
commander who endorses an atrocity of his troops acts no better, from
an expressivist standpoint, than does the accomplice who shouts words
of encouragement in the course of the offense's commission. Thus, the
expressivist considerations that justify assigning responsibility for of-
fenses even to those accomplices who attempt, but fail, to provide
encouragement also sustain an assignment of responsibility for an atroc-
ity to those commanders who provide their encouragement, in the form
of endorsement or acquiescence, after the fact.
In sum, where a commander fails to punish because he endorses or
acquiesces in his subordinates' offense, we ought to hold him criminally
liable for that offense. Doing so appropriately responds to the nature of
the harm that he has inflicted, and restores the victim to a position of
236. The classic case for this proposition is State ex rel. Attorney General v. Tally. 102
Ala. 25, 69 (1894). The Model Penal Code may be even more permissive insofar as it consid-
ers the mere attempt to offer aid or encouragement as a ground of complicity. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (1962). Recently, some scholars have argued that accomplice
liability holds even if there was no possibility that the defendant's contribution could make a
causal difference, so long as she intended to offer aid or encouragement to the principal of-
fender. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding and the Superfluity of Accomplice
Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 442-43 (2007). Others have argued that it ought to apply
this broadly. See Kutz, Causeless Complicity, supra note 201, at 300-01. From an expressive
standpoint, there may be no difference between aid that contingently arises after the fact and
aid that necessarily arises after the fact, so long as the would-be accomplice in each scenario
intends that the offense be committed. Still, it is not clear that expressivism provides a suffi-
cient justification for punishment; considerations of deterrence clearly counsel in favor of
privileging conduct that could have made a causal difference to conduct that could never have
done so.
237. To be clear, I am not contemplating scenarios in which a commander fails to punish
an atrocity of his troops on one occasion, and his laxity induces his troops to commit further
atrocities. I deal with such scenarios in Part II.C. See infra text accompanying notes 242-245.
Instead, what is at issue here is whether the commander's failure to punish causally contrib-
utes to the atrocity that he has failed to punish.
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equal worth. I turn now to scholarly objections, in an attempt to argue
that these should not detract from the appropriateness of the mode of
liability view.
C. Scholarly Resistance to the Mode of Liability View
To hold a commander liable for an atrocity of his troops that he nei-
ther ordered nor knew about in advance has been deemed "the most
conspicuous departure of the ICTY Statute from the principle that con-
viction and sentence for a morally disqualifying crime should be related
to the actor's own conduct and culpability. '238 The principle of personal
culpability is so sacrosanct that the ICTY Appeals Chamber has termed
it "the foundation of criminal responsibility."23 9 Further, scholars have
anointed the principle of personal culpability "the key to establishing
legitimacy in international criminal law"240 and "one of the most serious
candidates for inclusion" within a hypothetical "catalog [of] general
principles of law so widely recognized by the community of nations that
[it] constitute[s] a subsidiary source of public international law."24' In
response to these high-minded statements, this section endeavors to
show that the mode of liability view does not, in fact, contravene the cul-
pability principle.
As a preliminary matter, it is useful to confront a purported moral
distinction, first articulated by Mirjan Dama~ka, between varieties of
failure to punish. 42 On the first variant of the failure to punish, a com-
mander fails, on successive occasions, to punish an atrocity of his troops;
as a result, the commander's earlier failure (or failures) to punish caus-
ally contribute to subsequent atrocities that his troops commit, as his
troops come to expect that their misconduct will be treated with impu-
nity.'4' Dama~ka notes, correctly, that the failure to punish recurring
offenses is tantamount to the failure to prevent, if not a form of accom-
plice liability.2" Here, concerns about violating the principle of
culpability do not arise, because the commander is believed to have
played a culpable causal role in his soldiers' offense.
By contrast, on the second variant, the failure to punish is an isolated
event; no further atrocities are committed by the commander's subordi-
238. Dama~ka, supra note 44, at 468. Dama~ka refers here to just one of two kinds of
failures to punish. I argue that the distinction is misguided, and that neither kind violates the
culpability principle. See infra notes 243, 246 and accompanying text.
239. Tadi Appeals Judgment, supra note 6, 186.
240. Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 97; see also Dama~ka, supra note 44, at 470-
71.
241. Damagka, supra note 44, at 470.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 467-68.
244. Id.
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nates, and so the failure cannot be said to bear a causal connection to
their wrongdoing.245 It is here that Dama~ka sees "the most conspicuous
departure" from the culpability principle.246 For the sake of brevity, let us
call the first variant "failure to punish repeat offenders" and the second
"failure to punish one-time offenders."
Damagka is correct that there are indeed two analytic categories of
failure to punish. But, he is wrong to attach the normative significance to
them that he does. First, the commander who fails to punish one-time
offenders may nonetheless bear causal responsibility for subsequent
atrocities committed by soldiers who are not under his effective control.
The commander's failure may signal the tolerance of the military as a
whole, and so soldiers within the same military who fall under another's
command may infer that their offenses will be treated with impunity.
But, even setting aside the relationship between a failure to punish on
one occasion and any atrocities committed subsequent to that failure, we
have good reason to think that the failure to punish is at least sometimes
a ground for culpability for the underlying offense. In particular, the
thrust of my argument in the previous Section was that the failure to
punish, where it is motivated by endorsement or acquiescence in the un-
derlying offense, wages an expressive injury that makes the commander
a party to the underlying offense. On this argument, then, it is not rele-
vant whether the commander's failure to punish precipitates further war
crimes-whether of his own soldiers or another's. In cases of endorse-
ment or acquiescence, the failure to punish is sufficiently culpable in its
own right to warrant criminal liability.247
245. See id. at 468.
246. Id.
247. In the course of arguing that the Bush Administration lawyers who authored the so-
called "torture memos" bear responsibility for the Administration's unlawful interrogation
techniques, Christopher Kutz raises a consideration that, I believe, further undermines the
distinction between one-time and repeat failures to punish. Kutz writes,
Conceptually, ratification of prior acts in contexts where that ratification may have
future effects looks ... like a failed attempt to aid or encourage the prior acts,
where the aid or encouragement is of a type that is generally appropriately targeted
by criminal law because of its possible consequences.
Kutz, Causeless Complicity, supra note 201, at 304. To put the point another way, the lawyer
who ratifies earlier acts of torture does not know, at the time that he drafts his memo, that the
memo's stance will not lead to future acts of torture. Imagine, then, a hypothetical world in
which a lawyer drafted a set of memos identical to the "torture memos" but, because of some
turn of events outside of his control, no further interrogations were conducted, and so the Ad-
ministration had no further opportunities to torture those it had detained. The difference
between this hypothetical world and the actual world is simply one of moral luck. Our hypo-
thetical lawyer cannot be credited with the fact that his memos did not result in further acts of
torture. He is thus no less culpable than is the lawyer in the real world whose memos did--on
Kutz's argument, anyway-produce further acts of torture. By the same token, the commander
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Dama~ka is misled, I believe, at least in part because he ignores the
role of the command structure in making a commander a presumptive
candidate for liability. For example, he argues that holding a commander
responsible for the crime of his subordinates solely on the basis of the
commander's failure to punish is akin to "stigmatiz[ing] a parent as a
thief when his child commits a larceny.' '248 But the analogy between par-
ents and commanders is misguided. In the typical family, adult children
are not empowered to act on behalf of their parents. Even the parent who
approves of his child's transgression is not thereby made an author of, or
party to, that transgression. To be sure, the parent who has taught his
child to valorize wrongful acts of violence may bear some responsibility
for the violent acts that his child goes on to commit. But, the parent's
responsibility then flows not from the parental relationship itself but in-
stead from the parent's inculcation of a violent disposition in his child.
By contrast, we have seen that the very structure of the relationship be-
tween a commander and his subordinates is such that the subordinates'
acts, at least when of a military character, 249 presumptively redound to
their commander. Unless he takes steps to dissociate himself from their
action, or can justify his failure to do so, he incurs ownership of their
acts, whether he ordered them or not. Damagka's appeal to the parent-
child relationship ignores the normative dimensions of the relationship
between a commander and his troops.
A more general problem with those, like Damagka, who invoke the
culpability principle, is that they simply beg the question of what it en-
tails. For example, Chantal Meloni objects to the mode of liability view
because she believes that "no one, in fact, can be punished for a wrong-
ful act unless the act is attributable to him. 250 But, the question of when
an act is attributable to a person is precisely what is at issue. The point of
the expressive theory advanced in the last section was to establish that an
atrocity begun by a commander's subordinates can legitimately be at-
whose failure to punish does not eventuate in the commission of further atrocities by his sol-
diers is no different, from an expressive standpoint, from the one whose failure to punish does
facilitate the commission of further atrocities. To paraphrase Joel Feinberg, although the latter
commander may be culpable of more, he is not more culpable. Joel Feinberg, Collective
Responsibility, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL
AND APPLIED ETHICS 53, 68 (Larry May & Stacy Hoffman eds., 1991).
248. Dama~ka, supra note 44, at 470.
249, To be sure, the presumption does not arise for every act that the subordinates carry
out. If, for example, they decide to chip in for what becomes a winning lottery ticket, there is
no presumption that the commander ought to share in, or authorize distribution of, the winning
funds. This is because the shared purchase of a lottery ticket does not fall within the scope of
acts over which the commander has authority over his troops. Existing doctrine regarding the
scope of a commander's authority is sufficient for purposes of determining which acts are of a
military character.
250. Meloni, supra note 25, at 633.
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tributed to the commander if he unjustifiably fails to punish it. In a simi-
lar vein, Dama~ka contends that the problem with the mode of liability
view is that it attaches "opprobrium" to the commander "for heinous
conduct to which he has in no way contributed., 251 But again, whether
the failure to punish counts as a contribution is exactly what is at stake.
Other scholars who object to the mode of liability view seem to hold
that one may be culpable of an offense only if one causally contributes to
it, and does so at least recklessly, if not intentionally.2 2 These scholars
reason that the commander who fails to punish could not have caused his
subordinates' atrocity, because his failure to punish necessarily takes
place after his subordinates have participated in the atrocity, and one
cannot cause an event that has already occurred. In this way, these schol-
ars conclude that holding a commander liable for his subordinates'
atrocity simply because he failed to punish it violates the principle of
personal culpability.
The problem with the line of argument just advanced is twofold.
First, the culpability principle need not be so narrowly construed-there
are established departures from it in both municipal and international
law. 53 Further, the account that I advance respects the requirements of
even this narrow construal: Commanders who fail to punish their subor-
dinates because they endorse or acquiesce in the subordinates' offense
cause further injury, and they intend, or at least recklessly render, that
contribution. In short, those who assail the mode of liability view be-
cause they do not believe that a failure to punish constitutes participation
in the subordinates' offense lack a proper appreciation of the expressive
injury inflicted by the commander's failure to punish.254 Put differently,
251. Damatka, supra note 44, at 468.
252. See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 17, at 147 (citing, with approval, ICTY
case law that requires something more than mere negligence for conviction on a command
responsibility theory, because this case law preserves the culpability principle); O'Reilly,
supra note 46, at 101 ("[A] respect for human dignity under the law requires a certain level of
individualized fault before criminalization and punishment are appropriate. In those instances
in which superiors are held liable for negligently failing to prevent or punish crimes of subor-
dinates, the doctrine of command responsibility offends this basic tenet?').
253. Consider, for example, the felony-murder rule, see, e.g., Guyora Binder, The Cul-
pability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965 (2006), or conspiratorial liability on a
Pinkerton theory, in domestic law, see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), or the
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in international law, see, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 5,
art. 25(3)(d).
254. Damalka advances a related question-begging argument when he worries that hold-
ing a commander criminally liable solely because of his failure to punish risks impugning the
legitimacy of international judicial decisions, and inviting sympathy for defendants convicted
on this ground. Damalka, supra note 44, at 477-78. He concludes: "All in all, then, the em-
ployment of imputed forms of command responsibility could be detrimental to the socio-
pedagogical mission of international criminal justice." Id. at 478. But, a doctrine that fails to
respond to the expressive contribution that a commander makes if he fails to punish an atrocity
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the account that I have proposed does not seek to depart from a theory of
"just deserts" ;21 it just sees "just deserts" that have heretofore gone un-
noticed.
III. CONCLUSION: FROM A FEW BAD APPLES
TO NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The mode of liability view has a venerable history, recorded in writ-
ten pronouncements in international and domestic law. Yet, military
jurists have resisted this view, and legal scholars have rejected it, be-
cause they have not appreciated that commanders who unjustifiably fail
to punish an atrocity contribute to the injury that the atrocity waged. This
Article has urged that commanders who decline to punish their troops
because they endorse their troops' atrocity, or because they put their in-
terests before those of the atrocity's victims, ought to be held liable for
the atrocity itself. In such cases, to construe a commander's failure to
punish solely as a dereliction of duty is to further compound the atroc-
ity's expressive injury.
If the account that I have advanced here reflects an improvement
over current doctrine, then it will be worth noting that its implications
may extend beyond criminal liability for individual commanders. For, at
some point, the failure to punish may rise so high up the chain of com-
mand that one wonders whether the atrocity's perpetrators come to
include not just the soldiers who initiated it and the commanders who
failed to punish it, but the whole nation in whose military they serve.
Consider, for example, the case of Captain Carolyn Wood, chief military
intelligence officer at the Bagram Control Point in Afghanistan in De-
cember 2002, when two Afghan detainees died as a result of harsh
interrogation techniques. 6 Army investigative reports conclude that
Captain Wood lied when she told investigators that detainees' hands
were shackled above their heads in order to protect army interrogators;
in fact, the reports uncovered that the shackling was part of an effort "to
inflict pain and sleep deprivation., 25 7 Although a handful of the twenty-
eight soldiers implicated in the assaults have been prosecuted, no action
has been taken against Captain Wood.58 After leaving Afghanistan, she
helped to establish the interrogation unit at Abu Ghraib. She has since
because he endorses or acquiesces in it no better serves the "socio-pedagogical mission" of
international criminal justice.
255. Id. at 469.
256. See Douglas Jehl, Army Details Scale of Abuse of Prisoners in an Afghan Jail, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, atAl.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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been awarded two bronze stars, one each for the services she provided in
Afghanistan and Iraq,2'9 and is currently stationed at the Army's Fort
Huachuca, where she is charged with instructing soldiers in interrogation
techniques.2 6 The Bush Administration's treatment of Wood is tanta-
mount to its retroactive authorization of the interrogation techniques that
she oversaw, and so the possibility of widespread government complic-
ity, if not national responsibility, arises. On similar grounds, one might
seek to indict Serbia for having knowingly harbored Radovan Karadzic,
the Bosnian Serb leader charged with masterminding the worst massacre
since World War 11.26
1
Serious consideration of the prospect of national responsibility will
have to await another day. Even in its more modest guise, the account
advanced here gives a legally cognizable shape to our sense that many
wartime atrocities are attributable not just to the young, ignorant soldiers
who appeared in the photographs or grainy video footage taken at the
time that the physical injuries occurred. Commanders who neither or-
dered nor even knew about these atrocities in advance will also have
blood on their hands, at least figuratively speaking, if they unjustifiably
failed to punish the subordinates who initiated these offenses. Interna-
tional and domestic law should address these unjustified failures to
punish in a way that captures the expressive injuries that these failures
cause.
259. The Fifth Estate: A Few Bad Apples? (CBC television broadcast, Nov. 16, 2005)
[hereinafter The Fifth Estate]. For information regarding the documentary, see
http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/badapples/index.html.
260. The Fifth Estate, supra note 259.
261. See Dan Bilefsky, Karadzic Arrest Is Big Step for a Land Tired of Being Europe's
Pariah, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at AI0. Serbia's participation in Karadzic's arrest is seen as
an about-face from the policy of providing official protection to Karadzic-a policy motivated
by nationalist suspicion of the ICTY, and abandoned in the wake of the recent election of a
pro-Western government and the prospect of membership in the European Union. See id.
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